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CASE-COMMENT
THE TIME OF DISCOVERY RULE AND THE
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE DEFENSE FOR CREDIT
REPORTING AGENCIES IN ILLINOIS AFTER
WORLD OF FASHION v. DUN & BRADSTREET, INC.
The self-contradictory concept in the law that "justice"' can
only be achieved by occasionally allowing a manifestly unjust
decision to stand 2 has troubled courts, scholars, philosophers and
the public for centuries. These decisions, forced perhaps by a
technical rule of precedent, call into question the use of law as
an appropriate tool for placing order and certainty into the behavioral patterns of society.
Over six hundred years ago two conflicting and often competing purposes of the law, fairness to injured parties and the
certainty of eventual relief from stale claims, were set out in
Langbridge's Case. It was there suggested that the law must
provide certainty through precedent by treating everyone alike
and thus intermittently allowing an apparently unfair result.
Alternatively, it was argued that the law must always do that
which is morally right. 3
A primary example of this dilemma in practice is the puzzling case where certainty exists that: (1) the plaintiff has been
injured without fault of his own; (2) the defendant is responsible
for that injury and should pay some sort of damages; (3) every
1. "Justice" is defined as the "constant and perpetual disposition to
render every man his due." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 1002 (4th ed.
1968).
2. A leading Illinois case on this problem-the necessity of unjust
decision-is Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 193, 106 N.E. 785, 790
(1914), where a murderer inherited from his victim because the statute
did not explicitly forbid the inheritance. The court stated that, "Whether
this accords with natural right and justice is not for the courts to decide.
The laws of descent do not depend upon the ideas of court or counsel as
to natural right but depend entirely upon the provisions of the statute."
For a modern example of this type of case see Mosby v. Michael
Reese Hosp., 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1964) (refusing to apply
the "discovery rule" in medical malpractice case). The clearest statement of the reasons for such decisions is found in Pietsch v. Milbrath,
123 Wis. 647, 670, 102 N.W. 342, 346 (1905) (regarding fraud): "The Legislature is the judge, and the sole judge in such matters, subject to no
judicial review whatsoever, so long as it acts within the boundaries of
reason. It is far better that occasionally one should suffer severely from
the enforcement of the law, as the court finds it, than that they should
endeavor to bend the law out of its manifest scope to avoid that result."
3. 91 PROC. AM. PHILO. Soc'y 405 (1947), where the conflicting purposes of the law were set out when a lawyer argued to the court, "I
think you will do as others have done in the same case, or else we do
not know what the law is," and Chief Justice Stonore broke in: "No;
law is that which is right."
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"just-minded" person would agree that the defendant should be
liable; but, (4) the law must deny liability because of established
precedent favoring the defendant. The hapless plaintiff is presented with "justice" rather than damages.
Fortunately the situations which force this type of choice are
rare. But when they do arise, and when a conscientious judge
bases his ruling on precedent (dismissing the plaintiff perhaps),
that judge has decided that ultimate justice is provided by certainty and not by fairness. When a court cannot distinguish earlier cases or cannot interpret statutes to obtain a fair result, it
must decide whether "justice" requires that traditional concepts
of "fairness" should be subservient to the certainty provided by
precedent.
In Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 4 the Illinois Supreme Court faced the problem of a

potentially unfair result, mandated by both precedent and statute. The plaintiff was confronted with two seemingly insurmountable obstacles to his recovery for an injury caused by the
defendant, a national credit reporting agency. The decision in
World of Fashion, although deceptively simple on its face, involves issues and legal considerations far more broad than the
individual facts of the case indicate. The resolution of such issues, and the conflict between certainty and fairness implicit in
that resolution, suggests the processes of judicial analysis presently operating within the Supreme Court of Illinois and suggests
the significance of the World of Fashion decision.
The plaintiff in World of Fashion, a retail commercial business establishment, was libeled by a large national credit reporting agency' that published a false financial statement about the
plaintiff to a group of private subscribers. Because of the extremely strict confidentiality requirements imposed upon the
subscribers, the plaintiff did not discover that it had been libeled
until after the one year statute of limitations for defamation had
expired. 6
The limitations bar to recovery was reinforced by another
4. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975).

5. 36 AM.

JUR.

Mercantile Agencies § 2 at 177 (1941) where an

early and still precise definition of credit reporting agencies is set out:
Mercantile agencies [now generally referred to as credit reporting
agencies] are establishments which make a business of collecting information relating to the credit, character, responsibility, general
reputation, and other matters affecting persons, firms, and corporations engaged in business and furnishing this information to subscribers thereto for a consideration.
6. The text of the statute of limitations for defamation, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 83, § 14 (1975) reads "Actions for slander, libel or for publication of matter violating the right of privacy, shall be commenced within
one year next after the cause of action accrued."
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legal obstacle. The vast majority of American courts give credit
reporting agencies the defense of a qualified privilege7 in actions
brought against them by the subjects of credit reports. A defamatory statement is qualifiedly privileged when the interest the
defendant is seeking to protect is of intermediate importance;
that is, the law recognizes that the defendant may make some
statements defamatory in nature if his interest in making the
statements outweighs the plaintiff's interest in not having them
made. However, the qualified privilege is conditioned on a publication of the material in a proper manner for a proper purpose
and to a proper group or individual. When the defendant raises
a qualified privilege defense, an additional element is added to
the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff must allege and prove actual
malice on the part of the defendant.8
WORLD OF FASHION V. DUN & BRADSTREET, INC.

One month after the one-year statute of limitations for libel
expired, the plaintiff in World of Fashion filed a three-count complaint in tort. Counts I and II alleged commercial libel and count
III claimed malicious interference with plaintiff's opportunity to
obtain credit and ability to form contracts. The trial court dismissed all counts, reasoning that each stated the same cause of
action and that the one year statute of limitations governed all
three. The appellate court reversed the lower court's dismissal
of the malicious interference count, holding that this count indicated a separate and distinct tort and as such was governed by
a separate and longer time limitation. 9 The appellate court went
on, however, to affirm the dismissal of the libel counts, concluding that the Illinois "time of discovery rule" in which an action
7. For the best discussion of the qualified privilege defense in Illinois, see Judge v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., 17 Ill. App. 2d 365, 150
N.E.2d 202 (1958). The elements to be considered in determining
whether the privilege exists are: (1) good faith, (2) the importance of
the defendant's intent or interest, (3) publication limited in scope, (4)
a proper occasion for the publication, (5) proper manner of publication
to proper parties.
8. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 785-96 (4th ed. 1971) (herein-

after cited PROSSER,

TORTS).

9. The appellate court stated:
Defamatory statements may in themselves give rise to a cause of action for libel and slander and, at the same time, become the means
by which the torts of interference with contractual relationships or
prospective advantage are committed. In the latter, the means by
which the tortious interference is committed does not change the nature of the cause of action. Moreover, the means by which the tortious interference is committed does not subject the action to a limited period imposed upon the prosecution of an entirely separate and
distinct cause of action.
16 Ill. App. 3d 707, 714, 306 N.E.2d 549, 553 (1974).
See also Colucci
v. Chicago Crime Comm'n, 31 Ill. App. 3d 802, 334 N.E.2d 461 (1975) following the analysis of the preceding quotation. Accord, Reliable Mfg.
Co. v. Vaughn Novelty Mfg. Co., 294 Ill. App. 601, 13 N.E.2d 518 (1938)

(slander of title has different limitation period than libel).
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accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should have
known of the right to sue, was not broad enough to cover this
commercial injury and thus to avoid operation of the statute of
limitations. 10
On appeal, however, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court's holding on the libel counts. Applying the previously limited time of discovery rule the supreme court stated
that denying recovery "would be to follow an abstract and
mechanical reasoning in deciding when the cause of action accrued.""
Then, in three paragraphs of dicta, the court dealt with the
second obstacle faced by the plaintiff. Although the qualified
privilege defense was not at issue in the case at this point, the
court implied that the privilege might well be rejected.' 2 The
court suggested that credit reporting agencies cause excessive injury to the subjects of such reports when the reports contain
misstatements. Although the qualified privilege is given only
when the interest the defendant is seeking to protect is of sufficient importance to warrant the protection, the court implied that
the credit agencies' interest may not be important enough.13
This dicta suggest that it was the combination of the two obstacles to recovery, the statute of limitations and the qualified privilege defense, and not either individually, which lead the Supreme Court of Illinois to the decision it made. By using the
time of discovery rule as a gauge to determine when the plaintiff's cause of action had accrued, the court held that the cause
of action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The holding on the statute of limitations issue became the foundation
upon which to rest the qualified privilege dicta, for without the
decision to implement the time of discovery rule the court would
have had no basis for commenting on the qualified privilege defense.
Equity and Surrounding Circumstances Changed
Crucial to an understanding of how the supreme court justified its result in World of Fashion is an analysis of two methods
modern courts have used to avoid judicial results which are perceived to be unfair. The fair and equitable holding of a case
involving the World of Fashion facts would allow the plaintiff
10. The appellate court with little sympathy dismissed the plaintiff's
"time of discovery rule" theory in one paragraph, stating that it had no
authority to "engraft an exception upon a statute of limitation by judicial fiat." 16 Ill. App. 3d 709, 712, 306 N.E.2d 549, 552 (1974).
11. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1975).
12. Id.

13. Id. at 137-38, 334 N.E.2d at 164,
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to recover. 14 The two defenses, however, the statute of limitations and the qualified privilege, stand in the way of that fair
result and apparently shield the defendant. The certainty provided by the statute of limitations particularly conflicts with the
fairness of allowing the plaintiff to recover. 15
The first method often used by courts to elude the control
of precedent is the application of equitable principles. This approach simply denies a result dictated by statutes and precedent
where such a result is unfair or appears to be morally wrong. 16
Equity, once available only when no appropriate remedy was
available at law, now pervades legal issues. Although theoretically inappropriate in law actions,'" equitable principles have
become even more influential since the consolidation of the law
and equity courts.' 8
A special problem arises, however, when legislative action,
or inaction seems to indicate a legislative intent opposite in effect
to the equitable leanings of the court. If, for example, a statute
or precedent seems to be yielding unfair results in the courts
and the legislature has had the opportunity to correct the problem but has not done so, it may be inferred that the legislature
has weighed the unfairness apparently caused by the law against
the certainty and finality provided by the same law and has opted
for certainty. Of course, legislative inaction may be nothing
more than inertia. The restrictions the Illinois Legislature
placed upon the time of discovery rule and its application in pre14. The World of Fashioncourt summarizes this: "[W] e have no hesitation in saying the ends of justice in this case will be served .... "Id.
at 136, 334 N.E.2d at 164.
15. For a lengthy discussion of the tension created between the results of certainty provided by precedent and the judicial inclination to

achieve fairness through the use of equitable principles, see Keeton,
Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HAav. L. REV. 463 (1962).
16. See generally Trainor, Some Open Questions on Appellate Courts,

24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (1956) (favoring judicial action to revise old rules

and formulate new ones based on changes in society); Keeton, Judicial
Law Reform-A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts, 44

L. REV. 1254 (1966) (advocating a creative role for courts).
"equity" should not be used to avoid the intention of the limitations stat-

TEX.

17. Beginning over three hundred years ago, courts have ruled that

utes.

The court said in Benyon v. Evelyn, 124 Eng. Rep. 614, 636 (C.P.

1664) that, "[Ilt is better to suffer from particular mischief than a general inconvenience; and such a one must happen if way be given to equi-

table constructions against the letter of the act .... ." (referring to statutes of limitations); Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 4 Eng. Rep. 721, 762 (H.L.

1821) (the chancellor suggests that had the legislature wished equitable
constructions to be placed upon the statute of limitations it would have
expressed that desire); Sloan v. Graham, 85 Ill. 26 (1877); First National Bank of Jonesboro v. Road Dist. No. 8, Union County, 328 Ill. App.

122, 65 N.E.2d 396 (abstract opinion, 1946) (stating that the statutes of
limitation are purely legal, and equitable approaches are improper):
Graham v. Kaap, 213 Ill. App 576 (1919)

(court of equity should not

create a remedy when the statute barred a right).
18. See J. ULLMAN, Law and Equity, in A JUDGE TAKES THE STAND
154 (1933), for a detailed analysis of the law and equity consolidation.
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vious Illinois decisions thus should, at least, serve as a restraint
upon the court's equitable response to the World of Fashion
facts. 19
The second approach used by courts to avoid unfair results
is the application of a more subtle principle. This principle,
sometimes referred to as "changed circumstances," provides the
courts with a method of avoiding precedent or a statutory mandate when the precedent, viewed in light of the circumstances
surrounding both its decision and the conditions currently prevailing, seems unsupportable. 20 If circumstances of the surrounding times have so changed as to make the original decision a presently inequitable result given the changes, then such precedent
is no longer of any value. The rule of precedent, and its value
of providing certainty, should apply only if the facts and circumstances of the cases themselves are similar, and if the facts and
circumstances of the surrounding world are similar.
A 1920 decision for example, could reasonably hold that a
statute of limitations of two years governing actions against a
doctor who leaves an object in a patient's body after surgery,
is long enough. However, in 1920 medical knowledge had not
perfected the methods of sterilization currently in use; consequently, discovery of a foreign object in the body was often rapidly facilitated by growing infection and other complications.
But, in 1976, because of advances in sterilization techniques and
other medical improvements, an instrument can remain in the
19. For a long discussion of the philosophical attitude of courts when
they are acting in place of the legislature, see Janisch v. Mullen, 1 Wash.
App. 393, 461 P.2d 895 (1970), a case which adopted the time of discovery
rule for medical malpractice actions. The time of discovery rule states
that the statute of limitations begins to run when the patient discovers
that he has been injured. In Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121
(1939) (tax case) ("but they would only be sufficient to indicate that we
walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle."), the United States Supreme Court
sets out the general rule concerning the courts' interpretation of legislative inaction. In Morgan v. People, 16 Ill. 2d 374, 379, 158 N.E.2d 24,
27, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 852 (1959), the Illinois Supreme Court discusses
the relief from judgment statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1975), and
states that "[i]t is the established rule that exceptions to a statute of limitations will not be implied and if the legislature has not seen fit to except
a class of persons from the operation of a statute, courts will not assume
a right to do so." See also Fisher v. Rhodes, 22 Ill. App. 3d 978, 317
N.E.2d 604 (1974) (same statute).

20. For several early examples of the courts' attempts to modify the

impact of the statute when the statute apparently demands an outra-

geous decision, see Bedell v. Janney, 9 Ill. 193, 209 (1847) ("cases within
the reason, but not within the words of the statute are not barred, but
may be considered as omitted cases, which the legislature have [sic] not
deemed proper to limit."); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Jenkins, 103 Ill.
588, 595-96 (1882) (bankruptcy action barred by statute of limitation:
"The ancient rule was to construe them strictly, so as to exclude all cases
not expressly named in the statute, but this rule has been modified by
the more modern decisions.").
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body undetected for a much longer period of time.2 1 It may
therefore become necessary to extend the period during which
recovery may be allowed. Consequently, while the facts of the
cases themselves might be similar, a case decided in 1976, relying
on cases decided under a statute of limitations approved of in
1920, would be questionable.
Avoiding precedent by using the "surrounding circumstances
changed" method enables modern judges to deal honestly with
the earlier cases. Rather than suggesting that the older cases
were wrongly decided, this approach recognizes that the earlier
decisions were just when decided but inapplicable now because
of the change in surrounding circumstances subsequent to the
original holding. 22 Thus, courts can distinguish cases not only
on the facts of the cases themselves, but also on the basis of
relevant changes in societal conditions.
However effective the "changed circumstances" method may
be in dealing with judicial precedent it, like the equitable approach to precedent, faces increased problems when courts must
discern legislative intent. Although courts regularly look to legislative action to determine intent, the inferences of intent from
legislative inaction are much more difficult to draw. 23 What inferences may be drawn from the legislature's failure to amend
the statute in question? Does the legislature's inaction signify
that it does not feel the surrounding circumstances have changed
sufficiently to warrant a change in the law? Since the courts
in this situation have no legislative action upon which to base
presumed legislative intent, they must examine the changed circumstances in light of an anticipated legislative reaction to a judicial change. Would the legislative body, within a reasonably
short time, react to a judicial change, or failure to change, and
make the judicial interpretation inapplicable as precedent?
The operation of the "legislative reaction" test can be seen
by examining an Illinois Appellate Court decision regarding the
time of discovery rule in medical malpractice. In Mosby v.
21. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (action concerned a sponge left in the body twenty-three years earlier).

22. For a particularly interesting discussion of the changes brought
about in modern society by the impact of a modern credit economy, see
Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 641, 649 (1968). In World of Fashion, the court apparently analogized the changes in medical techniques which have made the early
malpractice cases inapplicable to the changes brought about by the
dramatic increase in the impact of credit and credit reporting. 61 Ill.
2d 129, 134, 334 N.E.2d 160, 162-63.
23. "Legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which to lean in determining legislative intent." Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 311, 421 P.2d
996, 998 (1966). Berry has come to be a very influential case on the
time of discovery rule.
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Michael Reese Hospital24 the appellate court followed precedent
based on a previous statutory construction and did not allow the

plaintiff to use the "time of discovery rule" when he discovered
a foreign object in his body after the statute of limitation had
expired. The court explicitly stated that it felt compelled to render an unfortunate and unfair decision because any changes in
the statutory period should be implemented by the legislature. 25
The legislature reacted immediately and nullified Mosby.26 If,
however, the Mosby court had used the test of "anticipated legislative reaction"-suggested above and implicit in the supreme
court's World of Fashion decision 27-it

would have been justified

in changing the law on its own initiative and the plaintiff in
Mosby would have recovered.
The World of Fashion facts, however, do not present as clear
cut an injustice as that attendant in Mosby.

Arguably, Mosby

presented a much clearer case for defendant liability; there is
very little ambiguity involved as regards a physician's liability
for malpractice when an object has been left in a patient's body
following surgery. In Mosby, only the statute of limitations frustrated the plaintiff's recovery. But, in World of Fashion,liability
was not clear even if the effect of the statute of limitations had
been avoided. The qualified privilege defense presented a second, and equally effective method for denying the defendant's
liability.
Thus, two crucial questions were raised by the defenses in
World of Fashion. Would the Illinois court have ruled the way
it did on either defense had not the other defense been present?
Would the anticipated legislative reaction to the court's decision
on either issue alone have been enough to justify the court's
change in the law? The answer to both of these questions appears to be no. Neither defense alone presents enough of an injustice to the plaintiff to allow the court to implement an equitable interpretation and negate the statutory language. And neither defense alone is based solely on precedent which can be modified by a "changed circumstances" test. The combination of the
two defenses in World of Fashion underlies the Illinois court's
decision to abrogate both.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE

TIME OF DISCOVERY RULE

The principal problem faced by the Illinois Supreme Court
in World of Fashion, and the only issue upon which the court
24.
25.
26.
27.

49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1964).
Id. at 342, 199 N.E.2d at 636.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1975).
61 Ill. 2d 129, 134, 334 N.E.2d 160, 160-63.
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actually ruled, was whether the statute of limitations applied to
bar the plaintiff's cause of action in libel.2 8 In deciding that the
action was not barred, the court implemented a "time of discovery rule" interpretation of the statute of limitations. The time
of discovery rule states that the statutory period of limitations
begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should
know, of the injury. Although this rule is often thought to be
a modern judicial invention created by the courts to deal with
medical malpractices cases, the time of discovery interpretation
has grown out of the historical development of the statute of
limitations.
Historically, society had felt little need for legislative statutes of limitation until 1623.29 The law of the ancients and of
Europe in the middle ages gave plaintiffs a perpetual cause of
action, trusting the plaintiff's inability to prove a case after many
years as a sufficient defense for the defendant.30 In time, however, such protection for the defendant was supplemented by the
equitable doctrine of laches which allowed the defendant to preclude the maintenance of the plaintiff's claim by asserting that
31
through inaction the plaintiff had acquiesced in the status quo.
At this early date the defense of laches could be used even in
law actions. But because of the vagueness of laches and the difficulty of weighing old evidence, early in the seventeenth century
Parliament enacted statutes of limitation which created an irrebutable presumption 32 that, after a certain number of years, the
evidence was, ipso facto, insufficient.3 3 The new statutes af28. Id. at 138, 334 N.E.2d at 165.
29. The basis of all modern statutes of limitation is Limitation of Ac-

tion, and Avoidance of Suits at Law Act, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16.

There

is some indication that the legislatures had acted earlier, possibly as
early as 1275, to set some limits, but the effect of such statutes has been

insignificant. See generally J. ANGEL, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW
11-12 (4th ed. 1861); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 300 (4th
ed. 1936).
30. See 34 AM. JuR. Limitations of Actions § 2 (1941).
31. See 2 J. POMERY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 169 (5th ed. 1941).
32. See Phoebe, a woman of color, v. Jay, 1 Ill. 268, 273 (1828):

The statute of limitations was made for the purpose of quieting parties after so much time has elapsed, as affords a presumption that
the evidence might be lost by death or forgetfulness. That this stat-

ute is a wise law, all who are conversant with trials in courts and
the frailty and forgetfulness of mankind will readily concede. The
law, therefore, discharges law suits, after so much time has intervened as to create presumptions that witnesses have died or forgotten the transactions; or, in other words, the law favors the diligent
and not the slothful.

For an early scholarly discussion of this, see J.
ACTIONS AT LAW 5 (4th ed. 1891).

ANGEL,

LIMITATIONS

OF

33. This clearly is an attempt by the legislature to impose an "abstract and mechanical" method of determining matters of evidence and
laches and proof. Early decisions have accepted the necessity of this legislation.

Clementson v. Williams, 12 U.S. 72, 74 (1814)

("The statute of

limitations was not enacted to protect persons from claims fictitious in
their origins, but from ancient claims, whether well or ill founded, which
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fected both legal and equitable actions while the doctrine of
laches was confined to those actions in which no specific statu34
tory period applied.
Modern statutes of limitation rest upon the same foundation.
These statutes are often viewed as bifurcated in nature:3 5 (1)
a codification of the time after which the plaintiff is presumed
unable to produce sufficient evidence;3 6 and (2) an arbitrary time
limit after which the defendant can be certain that no action
against him is possible.3 7 The fundamental emphasis of the statutes is the protection of defendants from uncertain, distant, or
unknown liabilities. This is referred to as the defendant's right
of repose. It is important to contrast this legislative protection
against the potential liabilities of defendants, with the traditional
judicial attitude toward a plaintiff's causes of action which remain undiscovered until after the statute of limitation expires.
may have been discharged, but the evidence of which may be lost.");
Davis v. Munie, 235 Ill. 620, 621, 85 N.E. 943, 944 (1908) ("a definite limit
of time within which the remedies included within this provision must
be prosecuted."). But see 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 764
(1927), which suggests that the bar is good only if the party has had
a full opportunity to press his claim.
Although the courts put great stress in the decisions concerning the
statutes of limitation upon the problems of evidence, the limitations are
directed primarily at a final, clear and definite period of liability. The
legislature has balanced the plaintiff's competing interests against the defendant's and has decided that the specified number of years is the answer to the problem. It is specious to think that the evidence is any
more stale, or the plaintiff any more hard-pressed, one day after the statute has run than one day before; courts, however, do not hesitate to let
the statutes control in these situations.
The Illinois cases which suggest that loss of evidence is the primary
thrust of the statute of limitations include: Helbig v. Citizens Ins. Co.,
234 Ill. 251, 84 N.E. 897 (1907); Phoebe, a woman of color, v. Jay, 1 Ill.
268 (1828) (presumption that evidence is lost by death or forgetfulness);
Trainor v. Koskey, 243 Ill. App. 24 (1926) (evidence presumed lost);
Speich v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 178 Ill. App. 266 (1913) (failure
of memory); Hayward v. Gunn, 4 Ill. App. 161 (1879) (presumption of
payment based on failure to remember facts). But see Neustacher v.
Schmidt, 25 Ill. App. 626 (1887) where the statute of limitations regardis said to be based on public policy.
ing 34.
payment
See 2ofJ.a debt
STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 735-36 (1826); Cross
v.
James, 327 Ill. 538, 158 N.E. 694 (1927) (court discusses the basing of
the statutes on the principle of laches).
35. In Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975),
Justice John Paul Stevens places great emphasis on this bifurcated nature and in discussing the Illinois time of discovery rule, distinguishes
cases involving personal injury from the cases involving property damages by relying on the bifurcated nature of the statutes.
36. See the Illinois cases, supra note 33.
37. Although courts must allow recovery to an injured party as a
necessary part of a "just" legal system, they must also protect potential
defendants from ancient claims. The courts' reason that even a party
responsible for an injury has the right to peace of mind after the expiration of a sufficient number of years:
[Y]et the court cannot act upon such circumstances. If it did, there
would be an end of limitation of actions in the cases of distressed
persons; for if relief might be given after twenty years, on the
grounds of distress, so might it after thirty, forty, or fifty; there
would be no limitation whatever, and property would be in confusion.
Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. 189, 194 (1843) (adverse possession).
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Generally, the early courts held that an undiscovered action
expires with the statute. The courts balanced the defendant's
need for certainty and finality against the plaintiff's right to recovery and the defendant usually prevailed.38
Courts have
shifted back and forth in their acceptance of the legislative
boundaries to bringing actions. Eighteenth century English
courts opposed the whole idea of statutory limitations on moral
and equitable grounds. 39 The arbitrary nature of the limitations
periods did not accord with the early courts' desires to provide
at the least the opportunity to prove a case. These courts favored
the retention of the judge's discretionary power to determine the
sufficiency of the proof.
This opposition, however, gradually shifted to the recognition
of the necessity of arbitrary time limits. The certainty provided
by the limitations replaced the unfettered equitable discretion
of the earlier judges. By the early nineteenth century the courts
generally accepted the statutes. The eighteenth century idea
that justice was equated with fairness had been replaced by the
nineteenth century idea that justice was certainty and finality.4 0
To ameliorate the often harsh results of the arbitrary time
limits, however, the early legislative bodies created certain limited exceptions to the statutes apparently based upon a presumption that even with the utmost diligence some classes of plaintiffs
could not discover or act upon their causes of action. 41 These
38. This attitude of judicial protection for the defendant began to
change in the middle of the twentieth century. Statutory limitations
seemed to produce unfair results in medical malpractice cases. The Col-

orado court, commenting on a statute which apparently barred recovery,
used these stunning words and said, "What a mockery to say to one,

grievously wronged, 'Certainly you had a remedy, but while your debtor
concealed from you the fact that you had a right the law stripped you

of your remedy.' " Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149 P.2d 372,
375-76 (1944).
39. Trueman v. Fenton, 98 Eng. Rep. 1232 (K.B. 1777) and Quantocks
and Others, 98 Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B. 1770), two early decisions by Lord
Mansfield, suggest that the statute of limitations was something to be

slipped around if at all possible. "And, in honesty, [the defendant]
ought not to defend himself by such a plea." Id. at 382-83.

40. The nineteenth century idea of fairness is reflected in Mosby v.
Michael Reese Hosp., 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 340-41, 199 N.E.2d 633, 636
(1964):
A statute of limitations is designed to prevent recovery on stale

demands. It is a statute of repose which gives a defendant a reasonable opportunity to investigate a claim and to prepare his defense.
* * . Although such a statute serves a laudable purpose in preventing old and vexatious demands, it also arrests meritorious claims.
Such is the situation here.
This decision has subsequently been repudiated by several Illinois Supreme Court decisions discussed in this paper.

41. Generally, a mental, physical, or legal inability to act has been
the articulated reason advanced for exceptions regarding disabilities. At

common law, people under disabilities had no legal standing to sue. A
careful analysis, however, suggests another principle at work in the modern cases.

It is settled that a subsequently arising disability does not

toll the statute once it has started running, even though the plaintiff may
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legislative exceptions, retained in the modern statutes, toll the
statute in a number of situations.4 2 For example, the statutes
do not run against a person under a disability such as minority,
insanity, or imprisonment. Nor do they run against one from
whom a cause of action has been fraudulently concealed. 43 In
be completely unable to act. Berman v. Palatine Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 371
(7th Cir. 1967).
Furthermore, a person under a disability can act
through a guardian or conservator to bring suit; a person in prison certainly is not restrained from having an action brought by his attorney.
Rather than simply saying that a person under a disability cannot
act, the law actually has created an irrebutable presumption that someone under a disability does not know of or understand his right to sue.
In Peach v. Peach, 73 Ill. App. 2d 72, 83, 218 N.E.2d 504, 509 (1966), the
court refused to toll the statute for a mentally retarded man who could
read, vote, and play pinochle, because, the court reasoned, the statute
is tolled only if the plaintiff "could not comprehend the nature of the
act giving rise to the cause of action or his rights."
In a bizarre case indicating the presumption of lack of knowledge,
an Illinois appellate court allowed recovery, based on the statute being
tolled, thirteen years after the death of a tortfeasor, to a plaintiff who
had been a foetus when the tort occurred. In re Kent's Estate, 12 Ill.
App. 3d 475, 299 N.E.2d 516 (1973).
Even more unusual is a recent case which did not even discuss the
statute of limitations but indicated that the lack of knowledge presumption could be extended quite far. In Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40
Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976) (currently in the Illinois Supreme
Court on a certificate of importance) the court allowed a cause of action
in medical malpractice to a child who was born and injured by a birth
defect eight years after his mother originally had been injured by the
doctor.
The general rule is that disabilities cannot be tacked together. J.
ANGEL, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW 197 (1861); 25 I.L. & P. Limitation § 85 (1956). Apparently, the only Illinois case available on this
point is Keil v. Healey, 84 Ill. 104 (1876) which actually decides that a
brief period free from a disability before another commences is enough to
start the statute running. Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, sub nom. 409 U.S. 894 (1972), allows the disability
of imprisonment to be tacked onto one of minority.
42. These exceptions are presently codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83,
§ 22 (1975) (disabilities).
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22 (1975). Parmlee v. Price, 105 Ill. App.
271 (1902) (an early case rejecting the time of discovery rule, which suggested that had the legislature intended a general application of the time
of discovery rule the specific exception for a cause of action fraudulently
concealed would be redundant). Although the holding of this case has
been repudiated, sub silentio, by the modern cases, its reasoning is still
powerful. Had the legislature intended a full implementation of the time
of discovery rule a fraudulently concealed action would be only as unknown as any other undiscovered injury.
Fraudulent concealment of a cause of action is quite difficult to establish in Illinois. There must be an affirmative act intended to deceive
the plaintiff which in fact succeeds in deceiving him. Skrodzki v. Sherman State Bank, 348 Ill. 403, 181 N.E. 325 (1932) (sale of mortgage
bonds); Wilson v. LeFevour, 22 Ill. App. 3d 608, 317 N.E.2d 772 (1974)
(affirmative fraud needed in a divorce action which required 12 consecutive attorneys); Solt v. McDowell, 132 Ill. App. 2d 864, 272 N.E.2d 53
(1971) (plaintiff discovered fraud eight months before statute expired);
Nogle v. Nogle, 53 Ill. App. 2d 457, 202 N.E.2d 683 (1964) (affirmative
fraud needed to set aside divorce decree); Proctor v. Wells Bros.,
181 Ill. App. 468, aff'd in 262 Ill. 77, 104 N.E. 186 (1914) (affirmative
fraud needed to allow refiling of action). See also the very stringent
requirements for fraud set out in Keithley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 271
Ill. 584, 111 N.E. 503 (1916), where the defendant made false representations about policy assets but the statute was still not tolled. Contra,
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fraud and disability situations, courts which have stated that the
reason for the limitations rests upon considerations of producing
evidence-the first of the two reasons-often completely ignore
44
evidentiary problems.

JudicialExceptions to the Statute of Limitations:
The "Time of Discovery Rule"
Although legislatures had modified the arbitrariness of the
statute of limitations in a few limited areas, in effect instituting
a legislative "time of discovery rule," the judicial change in attitude taking place in the early nineteenth century as the courts
moved from opposition to acceptance created a new problem. Although the courts wished to implement the statutes of limitations
they were unable to determine when the "injury" itself actually
occurred and thus when the statute began to run. Three separate, and completely distinct points in time were suggested: (1)
the time the technical legal "trespass" occurred even though no
concurrent damage may have arisen;4 5 (2) the time of the actual
Gunn v. Minnesota Life Ins. Co., 322 Ill. App. 313, 54 N.E.2d 596 (1944)
(semble) (no affirmative fraud needed).
An approach not pursued by the plaintiff in World of Fashion was
an attack on Dun & Bradstreet for fraudulently concealing the cause of
action because of the extremely strict confidentiality requirements extracted from subscribers. Certainly part of the reason for the secrecy
is protection of the credit reporting agency from the discovery of its mistakes, although this may be less important than the need for a competitive advantage in a fast growing field. Inasmuch as modern courts have
moved dramatically to a requirement of disclosure of important information in misrepresentation actions and away from the early cases holding
that passive non-disclosure was not actionable, a passive fraud theory
might have worked against Dun & Bradstreet. See Prosser's famous termite cases, Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960)
(recovery allowed); Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass.
677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942) (no recovery allowed); and see Fuller v. De
Paul University, 293 Ill. App. 261, 12 N.E.2d 213 (1938) (married apostate
priest barred by non-disclosure of facts in contract action against his employer, a Catholic university); Comment, JudicialEncroachment on Statutes of Limitation, 34 YALE L.J. 432 (1925).
The Illinois Supreme Court might have been inclined to look at the
secrecy as a type of quasi-fraud. See Duncan v. Dazey, 318 Ill. 500, 149
N.E. 495 (1925) where there was no active fraud needed when a confidential relationship existed between the parties. Accord, Gunn v. Minnesota Life Ins. Co., 322 Ill. App. 313, 54 N.E.2d 596 (1944).
44. Not only does fraudulent concealment toll the statute of limitations, but the same courts which state that the statute rests upon considerations of evidence ignore evidentiary problems in disability and fraud
situations. The legislature clearly feels that there is no need to balance
increase in difficulty of proof against hardship to the plaintiff here.
Disability cases can all involve very long periods of time. Often the
defendant is dead but his estate may still be liable years later when the
plaintiff's disability ends. If disabilities can be tacked together in Illinois, as suggested in the two Illinois cases on the subject, Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972) and Keil v. Healey, 84 Ill. 104 (1876),
the period could easily extend for eighty or ninety years. See the horrors
of such a result suggested by Orlando Bridgmen in Benyon v. Evelyn,
124 Eng. Rep. 614, 634 (C.P. 1664).
45. This is discussed in an underground trespass case, Treece v.
Southern Gem Coal Co., 245 Ill. App. 113 (1923). In Treece, however,
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damage even though the plaintiff might not have known of the
47
damage; 6 and (3) the time the plaintiff discovered the injury.
Unable to arrive at a consistent answer to this problem (and
coincidentally, looking for an escape mechanism from the inflexible time limits of the statutes) the early courts gradually forged
two classes of exceptions to the running of the statutory period 48
in addition to the legislative exceptions discussed above. The
courts determined that the statute would not run until the discovery of the injury in situations involving a disparity of knowledge between the plaintiff and defendant where the plaintiff had
had a relationship of confidence or expertise with the defendant
and where the plaintiff had relied upon the defendant's superior
knowledge, skill or expertise. This exception encompassed, but
was not limited to, professional malpractice situations.
The second judicial exception tolled the statute of limitations
in situations involving cumulative injuries, that is, injuries which
built up over a long period of time. This exception included,
for example, underground mining invasions 49 and illnesses or disthe Illinois court rejected the contention that the "trespass" itself was
the injury and determined that the limitation period began to run when
the land collapsed.
46. See, e.g., Calumet Elec. St. R.R. v. Mabie, 66 Ill. App. 235 (1896)
(statute runs from infliction of injuries regardless of knowledge of injuries).
47. The earliest American case found suggesting the time of discovery rule, Taylor v. Rowland, 26 Tex. 293 (1862), implemented the rule
in an action concerning a discovery that good title could not be conveyed.
Illinois did not squarely accept the time of discovery rule, by judicial
decision, until 107 years later. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d
656 (1969).
48. The following cases are the nineteenth century exceptions to the
statute of limitations. It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that the courts and writers realized that these cases, and the later
cases which followed, fit into a pattern of exceptions similar to that discussed in the text. Bement v. Ohio Valley Banking & Trust Co., 99 Ky.
109, 35 S.W. 139 (1886) (statute ran from discovery of signature on release); Blake v. Traders Nat'l Bank, 145 Mass. 13, 12 N.E. 414 (1887)
(discovery of sale bank stock); Brush v. Manhattan R.R., 13 N.Y.S. 908
(1890) (railroad company's illegal construction); Christ v. Chetwood, 20
N.Y.S. 841, aff'd in 22 N.Y.S. 1133 (1892) (lawyer collected money for
minor); Lewey v. H.C. Frick Coal Co., 166 Pa. 536, 31 A. 261 (1895) (underground trespass); Hancock County v. Hawkins County, 83 Tenn. 266
(1885) (adverse possession); Leach v. Wilson County, 68 Tex. 353, 4 S.W.
613 (1887) (actions of an agent); Yeary v. Cummins, 28 Tex. 91 (1866)
(patent bond); Taylor v. Rowland, 26 Tex. 293 (1862) (inability to convey title); Lightfoot's Adm'r v. Green's Ex'r, 91 Va. 509, 22 S.E. 242
(1895) (old man did not realize his land was sold); Hutchinson v. Sheyboygan County Supervisors, 26 Wis. 402 (1870) (bad tax sale). There
are almost five times as many cases which do not allow recovery even
though the plaintiff knew nothing of his cause of action until too late.
Clearly the rule is no recovery, and the cited cases are carefully controlled exceptions.
An early analysis of these cases is in Note, 21 CENT. L.J. 153 (1885).
This article should be compared to more recent treatments. Comment,
Judicial Encroachment on Statutes of Limitation, 34 YALE L.J. 432
(1925); Note, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
49. Wanless v. Peabody Coal Co., 294 Ill. App. 401, 13 N.E.2d 996
(1938); Treece v. Southern Gem Coal Co., 245 Ill. App. 113 (1923).
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eases which developed after long exposure to chemicals, dust, or
radiation. 50 As with the situations presented by relationships
of expertise or confidence, the facts of cases involving cumulative
injuries indicate that the plaintiffs could not have been expected
to know of their injuries within short statutory periods."
The clarity provided by analyzing the judicial evasions of
the statute of limitations in terms of these two exceptions has
been blurred somewhat by several modern courts' denomination
of a distinct problem as a "time of discovery" controversy, a controversy which grew out of the expanding concept of strict liability in the products liability field. While prior to judicial acceptance of strict liability all causes of action in products liability
accrued when the product was purchased, subsequent to the de50. The leading occupational disease case is Urie v. Thompson, 337

U.S. 163 (1949). See also Madison v. Wedron Silica Corp., 352 Ill. 60,
184 N.E. 901 (1933); McDonald v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 133 Ill. App.

2d 780, 274 N.E.2d 121 (1971); Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 133
Ill. App. 2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118 (1971) (parallel case).
Illinois has a statute which now deals with the time of discovery
rule in one area of occupational injury situations. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

§ 138.6(c) (2) (1975) states that a claim for workmen's compensation
must be made within 90 days subsequent to when the employee knows
or suspects that he has received an excessive dose of radiation.
51. Some modern developments concerning the rule can be seen in
Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970) (time
of discovery rule applies to negligent diagnosis) in which the Illinois Supreme Court discusses at some length the problem involving a patient
who could not possibly realize that a cause of action existed. Lipsey
repudiates an earlier appellate decision, Mosby v. Michael Reese Hosp.,
49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1964) (court felt powerless to act
absent legislative enactment regarding foreign object left in body) and
Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill. App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943) (no recovery after negligent treatment by doctor).
The time of discovery rule was also applied in Mathis v. Hejna, 109
Ill. App. 2d 356, 248 N.E.2d 767 (1970) (dye injected into spine). But
cf. Hundt v. Burhans, 13 Ill. App. 3d 415, 300 N.E.2d 318 (1973) (where
no mention was made of the time of discovery rule and a patient's action
was barred because the statute of limitations had run on a contract with
the doctor); Stein v. Baum, 89 Ill. App. 2d 142, 232 N.E.2d 96 (1967)
(doctor won by establishing no fraudulent concealment; time of discovery rule not mentioned).
For a discussion of the application of the time of discovery rule in
non-medical professional malpractice cases see the principal Illinois case
on the discovery rule, Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656
(1969) (rule applied against surveyor); Kohler v. Woolen, Brown &
Hawkins, 15 Ill. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973) (time of discovery
rule applied to lawyer who had lost a case after missing a statute of
limitations deadline) which repudiates Toft v. Acacia Mausoleum Co.,
322 Ill. App. 514, 54 N.E.2d 616 (1944) and Maloney v. Graham, 171 Ill.
App. 409 (1912).
An Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978 (1968) (when statute of limitations begins to run upon action against attorney for malpractice), suggests that
the majority does not apply the time of discovery rule to attorneys. The
Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District has handled four architect cases: Board of Educ. v. Perkins & Will, 119 Ill. App. 2d 196, 255
N.E.2d 496 (1970), and Board of Educ. v. Joseph J. Duffy Co., 97 Ill. App.
2d 158, 240 N.E.2d 5 (1968) denied recovery; but, following the Rozny
decision, this same court reversed itself and allowed recovery based on
the time of discovery rule. Society of Mt. Carmel v. Fox, 31 Ill. App.
3d 1060, 335 N.E.2d 588 (1975); Auster v. Keck, 31 Ill. App. 3d 61, 333
N.E.2d 65 (1975).
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velopment of strict liability, the courts have determined that the
statutory period of limitations for a personal injury action in
products liability begins when the plaintiff is injured. Some
courts have called this new rule an example of the time of discovery rule, but more precisely, because the time of discovery
and injury are not always coterminous, the rule is simply an abrogation of the traditional contractual idea that the statute runs
5 2from the time of purchase.
Underlying both the doctrine of strict liability and the
change in the computation of the statutory period, however, is
a fundamental new judicial concept, a concept which the World
of Fashion court would implement in a completely different con52. The Illinois position on the accrual of a cause of action for personal injury caused by a defective product is that the action accrues
when the injury occurs, not when the product is sold. Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970) (trenching machine); Berry
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974) (birth control
pills).
In Klondike Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890 (N.D.
Ill. 1971) the plaintiff's recovery for property damage was based on when
the accident happened, not when the product was sold. Gates Rubber
Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975), suggests that this is incorrect. The Gates case did not allow recovery for property damage
based on the time of discovery rule, reasoning that the property damage
limitation period should begin when the product is sold even though the
personal injury period starts when the injury occurs. This interpretation
is supported by Coumoulas v. Service Gas, Inc., 10 Ill. App. 3d 273, 293
N.E.2d 187 (1973) where a plaintiff could not recover for property damage resulting from a negligently installed gas boiler, the accrual of the
cause of action being calculated from the time of installation and not
the injury. Accord, Leroy v. City of Springfield, 81 Ill. 114 (1876) (sidewalk collapsed; action accrued when act was committed, not when extent
of property damage was discovered); Wilson v. White Motor Co., 118 Ill.
App. 2d 436, 254 N.E.2d 277 (1969) (personal property damage from collapse of truck); Austin v. House of Vision, 101 Ill. App. 2d 251, 243 N.E.2d
297 (1968) (anti-trust action, time of act); Sabath v. Morris Handler Co.,
102 Ill. App. 2d 218, 243 N.E.2d 723 (1968) (failure to obtain driveway
permit); contra, and presumably overruled, Reat v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 47 Ill.
App. 2d 267, 197 N.E.2d 860 (1967) (action runs from time of injury, not
time of amputation three years later); Calumet Elec. St. R.R. v. Mabie,
66 Ill. App. 235 (1896) (time of act, not six months later when plaintiff
became paralyzed).
Simoniz Co. v. Anderson & Sons, Inc., 81 Ill. App. 2d 428, 225 N.E.2d
161 (1967), though based on a decision since repudiated by the legislature and the supreme court, Mosby v. Michael Reese Hosp., 49 Ill. App.
2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1964), has not been expressly overruled and continues to exert a strong countervailing force upon the discovery rule. The
Simoniz decision concerned an action for property damage brought
against a contractor and material suppliers, significantly not "professionals." Recovery was denied because the cause of action accrued when
the work was done, not when the building collapsed. This case straddles
the line dividing the property damage cases from the malpractice cases.
See generally Comment, The Last Vestige of the Citadel, 2 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 721 (1974); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965) (statute of limitations:
when cause of action arises on action against manufacturer or seller of
product causing injury or death).
For general discussions of the strict liability problem from a different point of view see Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturersfor Injuries
Caused by Defective Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 9ag
(1957); Note, Damages-PersonalInjury-Reasonable Certainty and the
Statute of Limitations: A Re-evaluation, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 652 (1968).
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text. The strict liability cases apparently realize that modern
consumers and businesses must deal with manufacturers of numerous products. Modern society has replaced the individualism
of earlier times with a necessary interdependence. It is impossible
to function in the modern world without a great deal of reliance
on complex and sophisticated machinery. The necessity of certain
types of relationships, relationships between products and their
users, is often unavoidable. The recognition of these "unavoidable relationships" underlies, at least in part, the computation
of the statutory time period. The World of Fashion court seems
to have viewed credit reporting agencies, at least partially, in
terms of an unavoidable relationship and extended the period
53

accordingly.

Out of the two judicial exceptions applied to the running
of the statute of limitations-the relationships of confidence or
expertise and the situations involving cumulative injuries-and
possibly from an undefined and vague uneasiness about unavoidable relationships, the modern courts created the "time of discovery rule." The rule, which states that the statutory period of
limitation is computed from the time the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, of his injury and the right to sue,
has gained widespread acceptance in American courts when used
in professional malpractice actions. 54 What appeared to have
53. At 61 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164, the World of Fashion
court uses the phrase "an increasing awareness of the importance and
sensitivity of credit reporting" in questioning the need to allow credit
reporting agencies a great latitude in what they publish about businesses.
Implicit in this is the awareness of the dramatic and pervasive effect of
such reports. Five years earlier, in Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.
2d 418, 432, 261 N.E.2d 305, 313, Justice Underwood, who also wrote the
World of Fashion opinion, suggested that the limitations bar "would
emasculate much of the consumer protection afforded by Suvada [32

Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965)

(the leading Illinois case on products

liability) ] ."
Justice Underwood's connection of Williams with the facts of World
of Fashion appears to indicate that more is at issue than consumer protection; consumer protection is not at issue in World of Fashion at all.
The World of Fashion court, however, does seem to see a direct connection between consumer credit and commercial credit reports. See note
119 infra. If the Illinois court views commercial and consumer credit
reports as closely similar, the "unavoidable relationships" test, discussed
in the text, possibly will apply only in consumer protection areas.
54. See PRossE, Tosrs 144 (4th ed. 1971):
Quite recently there have [sic] been a wave a decisions meeting the
issue head-on, and holding that the statute will no longer be construed as intended to run until the plaintiff has in fact .discovered
that he has suffered injury, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it.

If there has been a "wave" of decisions, there has been a tidal wave of
law review articles. The INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALs, Limitation of Actions, lists well over a hundred articles, comments, and case notes in the
last fifteen years. Almost all of the law review material voices approval
of the time of discovery rule. But see Comment, Legal MalpracticeIs the Discovery Rule the Final Solution?, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 795 (1973),
suggesting it may become too easy to sue lawyers. See also Annot., 18
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been an unwritten but important limitation of the rule, that it

was to be used only in professional malpractice cases, no longer
applies. The World of Fashion court applied the time of discovery rule in an action for commercial libel.
Before a profitable analysis can be made of the Illinois Supreme Court's use of the time of discovery rule in World of Fashion, the other defense presented by the defendant must be explored. As suggested earlier, it appears that neither aspect of
the World of Fashion case, the statute of limitations or the qualified privilege defense for credit reporting agencies, can be separated from the other. The combination of the two defenses,
rather than either defense alone, apparently was the precipitating factor in the court's decision allowing the plaintiff to recover.
It is highly questionable whether the Illinois court would have
implemented the time of discovery rule for a commercial libel
injury had the court not also faced the credit reporting agency's
defense of qualified privilege.
CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES AND THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE DEFENSE

The second obstacle to recovery placed before the plaintiff
in World of Fashion was the qualified privilege defense given
to credit reporting agencies.5" The qualified privilege defense
to defamation recognizes that the person who publishes a defamatory statement may have some legitimate reason for doing so,
for example, to protect his own interests or the interests of another. The defense may be defeated by the plaintiff, however,
by showing malice or ill will on the part of the defendant or
by demonstrating that there was an improper publication of the
defamation, perhaps to too large a group or to persons who did
not have a legitimate interest in the material. 6
A.L.R. 3d 978 (1968) (when statute of limitations begins to run upon action against an attorney for malpractice).
Excellent discussions of the time of discovery rule in medical malpractice are found in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961),
noted in 64 W. VA. L. REv. 193 (1961), 41 B.U.L. REV. 569 (1961), 15 VAND.

L. Rgv. 657 (1962), and Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d
427, 248 N.E.2d 871 (1969). Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788
(1959) is significant for the analogy it draws between the underground
mining trespass cases and cases involving foreign objects left inside bod-

ies.

55. See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78
HARV. L. Rzv. 1191 (1965) favoring the expansion of business' right of
free expression and Comment, Defamation and the Mercantile Agency,
2 DE PAUL L. REV. 69 (1952).

56. See Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the Conditional
Privilege in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. REV. 865 (1931); Note, Liability for
Misstatements by Credit-Rating Agencies, 43 VA. L. REV. 561 (1957); 15
AM. JUR. 2d Collection and Credit Agencies § 22 (1964); and an extensive
Annotation at 30 A.L.R.2d 776 (Supp. 1974) (libel and slander:

of mercantile agency as privileged).

report
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Historical Perspective
Beginning in the late nineteenth century the vast majority
of American courts have given the qualified privilege defense to
credit reporting agencies, reasoning that the defendant's right to
report the credit information and the subscribers' right to receive
the information are more important than the injury caused the
plaintiff by a mistaken statement.17 Because modern commercial
society needs credit information to function effectively, the cost
of an injury caused by a credit reporting agency's mistake must
be borne by the injured party rather than by the credit agency
which made the mistake, or by the credit agency's subscribers
in the form of higher prices.
A second reason set forth for allowing credit reporting agencies to plead a qualified privilege defense involves an analogy
to private parties who might disseminate the same type of information. Courts have reasoned that a private individual has a
qualified privilege defense to an action for publication of defamatory material if the individual has an interest of his own to protect or promote, an interest of sufficient importance when
weighed against the injury caused by the possibility of defamation. The individual's qualified privilege defense is predicated
upon a limited publication to a limited group. By analogy, because a private individual could publish defamatory credit information and defeat a libel action for that defamation by raising
the qualified privilege defense, a credit reporting agency should
be allowed the same defense. 58
57. See Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, in
38 Soc. RESEARCH 1 (1971) for an anthropologist's analysis of the effects
of the business community on the law, and the effect of the law on other
cultural institutions not as subject to business influence.
58. The analogy between the privilege given to an individual and the
one given to a credit reporting agency appears strained in the modern
commercial world. The privilege for an individual is predicated upon
a limited publication; a credit agency generally will send the report to
any subscriber who wishes to pay for it.
A second area of discontinuity between individuals and the credit
reporting agencies involves the interest sought to be protected by the
party making the defamatory statement. Generally the qualified privilege defense has been given, in commercial settings, to individuals (or
businesses) who provide credit, employment, or financial information in
an attempt to protect their own commercial interests. The interest being
protected is that of the publisher himself. See PRossER, TORTS 785 (4th
ed. 1971). However, it would seem that a credit reporting agency has
no interest of its own to protect by the publication of the information.
The credit agency reports the information solely for the generation of
a profit, not to protect either itself or the community.
Although the argument is forcefully made that the credit agencies
actually serve the better interests of society-and this argument has
strong validity-the fact that the greater interests of society are advanced because of the reports does not affect the fact that the credit
agency itself has no interest to protect. In fact, if the argument is that
the agencies serve the public interest, and if that is their prime function,
the agencies should possibly be given an absolute privilege. Of course,
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In the United States, only Georgia59 and Idaho refuse the
privilege defense to credit reporting agencies. Based on old but
revitalized cases these states apply a standard of strict liability
for defamation."' In addition to these jurisdictions, the principle

no one seriously advances that option. (No one other than the credit
agencies.) Apparently the theory behind the defendant's attempt, in
World of Fashion, to obtain "mass-media protection" and the benefits of
the many defenses offered to the media, was this public interest approach. As discussed in note 61 infra, the World of Fashion court was
unpersuaded.
The leading English case, MacIntosh v. Dun, 18 A.C. 390, 2 B.R.C.
203, 12 Am. Cas. 146 (1908) rejects the qualified privilege defense for
credit reporting agencies at least partly on the grounds tht the credit
agency has no interest of its own to protect.
59. Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 218 S.E.2d 54 (1975)
(commercial Goliath); Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886) (because the defendant had no public or moral duty to publish there can
be no qualified privilege).
60. Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 704, 139 P.
1007, 1010 (1914). The court reasons:
The only safe and just rule, either in law or morals, is the one that
exacts truthfulness in business as well as elsewhere and places a
penalty upon falsehood, making it dangerous for a mercantile, commercial or any other agency to sell and traffic falsehood and misrepresentation about the standing and credit of men or corporations.
61. At 61 Ill. 2d 129, 138, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164, the court briefly mentions a subtle collateral issue in World of Fashion. This issue involves
the question of applying strict liability in defamation. The defendant
credit reporting agency suggested that credit reports should have massmedia protection.' Although a sophisticated argument was made on this
point-that reports serve the public interest therefore they are public
media-the Illinois court was not convinced. The court held that the
agency does not have the constitutional protections given mass-media.
As support for this point, the court cited Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971).
Grove is significant in at least two respects: first, it shows the legal
strategy of the large national credit reporting agencies to be one of an
aggressive and expansive scope. Apparently the credit reporting agencies are not satisfied with only the qualified privilege, either because
they wish to protect themselves against situations involving fairly clear
negligence, or more speculatively, because the agencies realize that the
qualified privilege is under a general attack and may succumb completely. This might explain why the qualified privilege was not even
mentioned in the Grove case. Secondly, the courts will not extend massmedia protection to highly confidential publications. See also Oberman
v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1972); Kansas Elec.
Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 448 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1026 (1971).
An interesting sidelight on these cases is supplied by Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), noted in 8 J. MAR. J. 531 (1975) which
determined that states could not impose strict liability on defamation.
Where a private individual is libeled by mass-media, he must show either actual malice (ill will) or prove his own damages. Although the
cases cited in World of Fashion indicate mass-media protection will not
be applied to credit reports, the instability of the law regarding libel following Gertz cannot be ignored, particularly when examining the minority position of Georgia and Idaho. Georgia and Idaho apply strict liability to credit reports circulated by credit reporting agencies.
Although the case cited in World of Fashion as support for denying
mass-media protection, Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433
(3rd Cir. 1971) was decided before Gertz, a recent Georgia case which
re-emphasizes Georgia's commitment to the minority position of strict
liability, Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 218 S.E.2d 54 (1975)
cites Gertz and says that it does not apply to credit reporting agencies.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment e (Tent. Draft
No. 21, 1975).
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minority case decided in England in 1908, Macintosh v. Dun,6 2
rejects the privilege defense on three grounds: (1) the subscription group is not limited enough because basically anyone can
subscribe; (2) the credit reporting agency prepares the report
solely for its own profit motive and not for the general benefit
of society; and (3) social policy should require the party causing
an injury to pay for that injury. The British court summarized
its position by asking:
Is it in the interest of the community, is it for the welfare of
society, that the protection which the law throws around communications made in legitimate self-defense, or from a bona fide
sense of duty, should be extended to communications made from
motives of self interest by 63persons who traffic for profit in the
characters of other people?
Whatever sympathy Macintosh might have generated in the
United States was eliminated in 1914 when Professor Jeremiah
Smith published a devastating rebuttal to that case in the Columbia Law Review. 64 Professor Smith's argument focused on the
need for the credit reports by the business community. A second
reason stressed by Professor Smith for allowing the qualified
privilege defense was that the agencies did not cause enough
damage with their occasional mistakes. Although the principal
case and the article are over fifty years old, they contain all the
essential elements of both positions still put forward in the modern cases. However, it becomes necessary to reevaluate these
positions. Has a dramatic change in modern society, brought
about in large part because of a shift to a credit society, taken
62. 18 A.C. 390, 2 B.R.C. 203, 12 Am. Cas. 146 (1908).
63. 2 B.R.C. 203, 213-14. The court continues with a concise statement of the problems involved with credit reports and credit reporting
agencies:
The trade is a peculiar one; still there seems to be much competition for it; and in this trade, as in most others, success will attend
the exertions of those who give the best value for money and probe

most thoroughly the matter placed in their hands. There is no reason to suppose that the defendants generally have acted otherwise
than cautiously and discreetly. But information such as that which
they offer for sale may be obtained in many ways, not all of them
deserving of commendation. It may be extorted from the person
whose character is in question, through fear of misrepresentation or
misconstruction if he remains silent. It may be gathered from gossip. It may be picked up from discharged servants. It may be betrayed by disloyal employees. It is only right that those who engage
in such a'business, touching so closely very dangerous ground,
should take the consequences if they overstep the law.
It is interesting to note that Congress, when enacting the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970), felt compelled to spend hundreds of pages protecting the consumer, creating immense problems of
administration for the Federal Trade Commission, when a very simple
remedy-denial of the qualified privilege defense for credit reporting

agencies-would have been much more comprehensive.

The remedy

suggested in Macintosh is, of course, far more sweeping than that of the

F.C.R.A.
64. See Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies, 14
COLUM. L. REV. 187 (1914).
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place? Has the central thesis of Professor Smith's article been
eviscerated by the dramatic changes in the modern business and
consumer world? If so, the circumstances surrounding the commercial world in 1976 have so changed from the circumstances
in 1914, and an argument which was perfectly valid and just in
1914 may no longer be tenable. Modern cases giving the qualified privilege defense to credit reporting agencies generally have
not analyzed the dramatic change in circumstances since the
precedent was established fifty years ago. Basically, there have
been few developments in this area of the law. The courts which
have ruled subsequent to 1914 upholding the qualified privilege
defense have based their decisions on Professor Smith's article
and the precedent it cites. The minority position of Idaho and
Georgia pre-dated this development."e
Another problem presented by the modern cases which give
credit reporting agencies the qualified privilege defense involves
the central premise of those cases: the innocent injured party
who has been defamed by a credit reporting agency must absorb
the cost of the injury and the defendant escapes liability not because it did not cause the injury but because it has a defense.
But this premise, that the plaintiff must absorb the cost of the
defendant's tort, seems directly opposite to the rationale given
by these same courts when they implement the time of discovery
rule in statute of limitations cases. In time of discovery rule
cases the defendant is made to bear the cost of his own tort even
though he may have a technical statute of limitations defense.
The two lines of cases appear to be directly contradictory.
Although the World of Fashion court did not explicitly deal
with the contradiction between the two types of cases-the time
of discovery rule, and the qualified privilege defense-the court
apparently recognized the contradiction and decided not to accept
it. Implicit in the plaintiff's recovery is the refusal by the Illinois
Supreme Court to decide one way in time of discovery rule cases
and the opposite way in qualified privilege defense cases. Consequently, although the overwhelming majority of American
courts have moved in one direction by providing a technical defense for credit reporting agencies, and in the opposite direction
by vitiating a technical defense in time of discovery rule cases,
World of Fashion indicates that the Illinois trend will be toward
consistency in both areas. Opting for a position defending the
innocent injured plaintiff regardless of the defendant's technical
defenses, the Illinois court implemented the time of discovery
rule in a commercial context and suggested, by dicta, that the
65. See 15 AM.

JUR.

2d Collectionand Credit Agencies § 22 (1964).
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qualified privilege would be of no assistance to a credit reporting
agency.
The attempt by the Illinois Supreme Court to achieve consistency regarding the two facets of the World of Fashion facts, however, was not accompanied by the same degree of consistency
in dealing with other Illinois developments concerning statute
of limitations litigation. In 1975, the year World of Fashion was
decided, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Illinois
General Assembly also dealt with Illinois' time of discovery rule.
The two courts and the legislative body all had a rather different
interpretation of the time of discovery rule.
ILLINOIS, 1975: THREE DIFFERENT APPROACHES
TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Faced with dramatic pressure from the medical community,
pressure reinforced by the general outcry against rising professional costs and insurance rates,6 6 the Illinois General Assembly
enacted in the summer of 1975 a comprehensive medical malpractice statute which included a section on the time of discovery
rule.6 - The legislature stepped back from the judicial expansion
of its earlier position (in Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital68 the
supreme court determined that negligent diagnosis or treatment
was included in the 1965 statute which was written to deal with
situations in which a foreign object had been left in a patient's
body6 9 ) and legislatively determined that there would be a sig66. See Henahan, Malpractice, 237 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 11 (1976), for
a comprehensive discussion of the modern crisis in medical malpractice,

with a special concentration on factors of insurance and the interplay
between doctors and lawyers.

See also Scott, For Whom the Time Tolls-Time of Discovery and
the Statute of Limitations, 1976 ILL. B.J. 326, for a comprehensive discussion of the time of discovery rule in Illinois and its effect on professional
costs. It appears that Judge Scott disregarded a provision of the new
medical malpractice statute by stating that the outside limit for a malpractice suit is only five years. The new law set an outside limit of five
years from the act for negligent treatment and diagnosis but ten years
from the act for foreign objects left in the body.
67. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1975).
68. 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970). See Comment, Statute of
Limitations in an Action of Malpractice,64 DICK. L. REv. 173 (1959).
69. Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966) (decision implements time of discovery rule in medical malpractice cases) was cited
as the principle authority for this interpretation of the time of discovery
rule. However, Berry does not involve statutory construction at all.
Oregon did not have a statute allowing the time of discovery even for
foreign objects. The Oregon court said:
The contention is made that a decision of this kind amounts to
judicial legislation. The legislature, however, did not provide that
the time of accrual was when the physician performed the negligent
act. This court did. The legislature left the matter undetermined.
A determination that the time of accrual is the time of discovery is
no more judicial legislation than a determination that it is the time
of the commission of the act.
Id. at 313, 421 P.2d at 999. One year after the Berry decision the Oregon
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nificant difference between the negligent diagnosis and treatment cases and the foreign objects cases. The 1975 statutory
amendment recognizes the time of discovery rule but puts an
outside limit on the time from the original act of malpractice
within which a suit must be brought. The current Illinois law
thus states that the plaintiff has two years to bring a suit from
the time of discovering the injury but in no case may a suit be
maintained later than five years from the negligent conduct itself
if that act is one of diagnosis or treatment. If, however, the
malpractice involves a foreign object left in the patient's body,
the outside limit is extended to ten years. The legislative intention is clear.70 Lipsey had gone too far in equating diagnosis
and treatment with foreign objects. While, however, the legislature in 1975 was deciding that the time of discovery rule had
to be more limited than the supreme court's interpretation of
it in Lipsey, the supreme court, in World of Fashion, was expanding the use of the rule and inferring legislative intent from Lipsey.
In Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp.,71 decided in 1975 several
months before World of Fashion, Judge John Paul Stevens, writing for the seventh circuit, refused to extend the scope of the
time of discovery rule in a case concerning damage to commercial
property. Judge Stevens, in a vigorous and detailed analysis of
the Illinois precedent, decided that the time of discovery rule
in Illinois was limited to situations involving relationships of expertise or confidence (the malpractice cases) and to situations
where a defective product caused a personal injury. In Gates
the plaintiff did not know that its commercial property had been
injured until after the statute of limitations had run. The Gates
view thus limits the judicial exceptions to the statutory period
2
to cases of personal injury.
court extended its decision, not a statute, to include a negligent diagnosis
or treatment. Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1. 452 P.2d 564 (1967).
70. Referring to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1975) (medical malpractice statute of limitations) Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d
603 (7th Cir. 1975) discusses legislative intent:
If we are to consider only the interests of a specific litigant, the case
for a discovery rule after ten years would be just as strong as after
only two years have passed. Presumably, however the statute reflects a judgment that such cases will be sufficiently infrequent to
make it appropriate to subordinate the interests of these plaintiffs
to the general interest in permitting physicians to limit the scope of
their contingent liabilities, and thus their need to pay insurances
costs which ultimately become a part of society's medical expense.
Id. at 612.
71. 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975). This case was followed in Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & Co 522 F 2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1975) (no time
of discovery rule in commercial transaction).
72. Judge Stevens places great emphasis in Gates on the repose aspect of the statute of limitations and implies that the Rozny "balancing
test" may be substantially less important than the Illinois court would
like to believe. In Gates, Judge Stevens said:
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A few months after the Gates decision, however, the Illinois
Supreme Court in World of Fashion7 3 analogized the facts of a
commercial injury arising from a libelous credit report to the
facts of the personal injury cases involving professional malpractice and defective products and implemented the time of discovery rule in a commercial defamation action. Gates can be reconciled with World of Fashion only if a commercial defamation is
considered to be a personal injury.
World of Fashion: The Process of JudicialAnalysis
Two factors of the World of Fashion decision, brevity and
unanimity, may speak more decisively to the significance of that
decision than the straight-forward holding of the case itself.
Both the brevity and the unanimity suggest that the supreme
court had a definite idea about where it wished to go. Although
the decision probably can be justified on its individual facts, the
supreme court apparently did not consider the potential ramifications of its holding and the tremendous expansion of the time
of discovery rule which can be inferred from World of Fashion.
Either that, or, the supreme court was only too well aware of
the ramifications and intended a dramatic broadening of the statute of limitations exceptions.
The World of Fashion decision can be read to stand for any
of the following rules starting from the broadest possible holding:
1. No cause of action will accrue until the plaintiff knows
would
or reasonably should have known of the injury. (This
74
rule.)
discovery
of
time
the
of
implementation
be total
2. No cause of action will accrue until the plaintiff knows
or reasonably should have known of the injury, but only if the
injury is severe enough to warrant equitable outrage if the plain75
tiff does not recover.
[E]ntirely apart from the merits of the particular claims, the interest

in certainty and finality in the administration of our affairs, especially in commercial transactions, makes it desirable to terminate
The separate incontingent liabilities at specific points in time....
terest in finality outweighs the interests in affording every plaintiff
a remedy for his wrong...
Id. at 611-12. Accord, Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140
(1934) (a now repudiated decision denying the use of the time of discovery rule). In Albert, the court said, "While hardships may arise in particular cases by reason of this ruling, a contrary ruling would be inimical
to the repose of society and promote litigation of a character too uncertain and speculative to be encouraged." Id. at 139, 67 S.W.2d at 142.
73. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975).
74. Id. at 137, 334 N.E.2d at 164 ("The purpose of a statute of limitations is certainly not to shield a wrongdoer. . . ."). Id.
75. Id. at 134, 334 N.E.2d at 162-63 ("Such a construction often brings
'obvious and flagrant injustice'.").
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3. No cause of action will accrue until the plaintiff knows
or reasonably should have known of the injury, but only if the
recovery and consequent liability of the defendant does not seem
76
equitably untenable.
4. No cause of action will accrue until the plaintiff discovers
the injury in situations where the statute of limitations is very
short (libel for example, at one year) and where the plaintiff
could not reasonably be expected to know of the injury within
77
the short time allowed to bring an action.
5. No cause of action will accrue in personal injury or quasipersonal injury cases (defamation) 78 until the injury is discov79
ered.
6. The time of discovery rule will apply in defamation actions against credit reporting agencies.8 0
The Illinois Supreme Court based its reasoning in World of
Fashion, implementing the time of discovery rule for commercial
libel by a credit reporting agency, on four carefully circumscribed
modern Illinois Supreme Court cases and on three equally limited
Illinois Appellate Court decisions.
In Rozny v. Marnul,81 the principle Illinois case on the time
of discovery rule, the supreme court used the "relationship of
confidence or expertise" exception in an action against a surveyor. The plaintiff discovered, after the statute had expired,
that part of his driveway and garage were on his neighbor's property. The Rozny court drew its authority from different jurisdictions throughout the United States, authority all focusing on
the modern formulation of the time of discovery rule. But, the
Rozny decision is limited in two important ways. The court explicitly drew authority for extending a surveyor's liability for
76. Id. at 133, 334 N.E.2d at 162 ("passage of time ... so greatly increases the problems of proof that it has been deemed necessary to bar
plaintiffs . ... ).
77. One sentence in the Gates opinion suggests this subtle possibility
for interpreting World of Fashion. The court implies that the discovery
rule should apply only where the statute of limitations is very short. Libel, at one year, is the shortest period in the law. 508 F.2d 603, 612.
78. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) determining that reputation is not a property right protected by the due process clause of the
14th amendment. If the reasoning in Campbell is followed, an argument
can be made that an injury caused by a defamatory statement must be
some type of personal injury. And, if defamation is a personal injury,
there appears to be a definite connection between the personal injury
cases cited as authority in World of Fashion and the facts of the defamatory damage to a commercial business's reputation at issue in World of
Fashion.

79. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 134-35, 334 N.E.2d 160, 163 ("an action to recover
for personal injuries .... ").
80. Id. at 136, 334 N.E.2d at 164 ("action accrued at the time

[the plaintiff] knew or should have known of the existence of the

allegedly defamatory report.").
81. 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
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negligence from a recently enacted statute which also had extended that liability. 2 The Rozny decision also limited itself to
its own facts. 88
The other strong authority cited in World of Fashion was
Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospita 8 4 which extended Illinois' codified, albeit limited, time of discovery rule.8 5 Although the statute allowed a plaintiff to use the rule when a foreign object had
been left in the body, the Lipsey court determined that the statute also covered actions for negligent diagnosis or treatment. 86
The Lipsey decision rests entirely on presumed legislative intent.
Ironically, five years later when the World of Fashion court was
relying on Lipsey and upon its analysis of legislative intent to
expand the time of discovery rule, the Illinois General Assembly
was limiting the Lipsey decision.
Additional support for the plaintiff in World of Fashion was
supplied by two supreme court products liability cases and three
appellate cases87 which had applied the rule using a traditional
exception. Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. 8 8 and Berry
v. G.D. Searle & Co.8 9 determined that a plaintiff's personal injury cause of action in products liability accrued when the plaintiff was injured and not when the product was purchased. As
suggested earlier, these cases deal with a somewhat different
proposition than the time of discovery rule, namely, the extension
82. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 24g (1975).

83. 43 Ill. 2d 54, 72, 250 N.E.2d 656, 665 ("under the facts and circumstances as presented. .. ").
84. 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970).
85. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1975).
86.

46 Ill. 2d 32, 41, 262 N.E.2d 450, 455.

Frohs v. Greene, is the lead-

ing decision discussing the relation of foreign objects cases to negligent
diagnosis or treatment cases. 253 Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564 (1967). The Frohs
case, cited with great approval in Lipsey, did not involve a statutory construction problem at all. It merely extended a previous court decision
implementing the time of discovery rule for foreign objects left inside
bodies, Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966). In addition,
ironically, the Frohs plaintiff would have been barred by the Illinois
statute of limitations in any case because the claim arose from acts occurring 16 years before the suit was filed, and the Illinois absolute limitation
is ten years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1975). See also Note, Tort
Law, Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, 70 Wis. L.
REv. 915 (1970) for an analysis equating foreign objects cases with negligent treatment and mis-diagnosis cases.
87. The Illinois appellate cases relied upon in World of Fashion applied the time of discovery rule by implementing two traditional judicial
exceptions to the running of the statute of limitations. Kohler v. Woolen,
Brown & Hawkins, 15 Ill. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973) (relationship of confidence or expertise) was a successful action against an attorney. McDonald v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 133 Ill. App. 2d 780, 274 N.E.

2d 121 (1971) (cumulative injury) and Wiggington v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 133 Ill. App. 2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118 (1971) (companion case)
were occupational disease actions.
88. 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
The discussion of the
89. 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550. (1974).
time of discovery rule in Berry is dicta; the plaintiff did not recover
damages even with the advantage of the rule.
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of a manufacturer's liability beyond the traditional limits of warranty and privity of contract.9 0 Although such products liability
cases lend vague support to a developing judicial concern with
"unavoidable relationships," and can be related to the time of
discovery rule in that manner, the interconnection is, at best,
undefined.
The World of Fashion court did not cite numerous older Illinois decisions which did not allow a time of discovery rule, apparently concluding that these decisions had been overruled, sub
silentio, by Rozny.9 1 Following the recitation of Illinois prece90. It is stretching the use of the term "time of discovery rule" to

apply it to products liability/personal injury cases. Although the plaintiffs in these cases did not know that the product was defective until
it injured them, they, of course, did not have a cause of action in strict
liability until they were injured.
Until the advent of strict liability in products liability, e.g., Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), and Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961), the earlier cases held that the cause of action accrued when
the product was sold. A necessary concomitant of the increased liability
of products liability was an extention of the time to sue. At one point,
Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co. suggests that the whole purpose of strict
liability in products liability would be vitiated if the time of action did
not run from the time of injury. 45 Ill. 2d 418, 432, 261 N.E.2d 305,
313,
An important distinction is drawn in some of the underground trespass mining cases, particularly Treece v. Southern Gem Coal Co., 245 Ill.
App. 113 (1923), notably that the cause of action accrues not when the
trespass occurs but when the injury-such as the land collapsing-occurs.
This is the same situation as in products liability cases.
91. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 134-35, 334 N.E.2d 160, 162-63. The World of Fashion court cited cases which have implemented the time of discovery rule
in Illinois. Uncited, however, are numerous Illinois cases which have
not allowed recovery and have refused to accept the time of discovery
rule exception. Jackson v. Anderson, 355 Ill. 550, 189 N.E. 924 (1934)
(unknown claim barred regarding issuance of stock); Lancaster v.
Springer, 239 Ill. 472, 481, 88 N.E. 272, 275 (1909) (lana deed; "the failure
of the complainants to learn of their cause of action does not prevent
the operation of the statute of limitations,"); Steele v. Steele, 220 Ill. 318,
77 N.E. 232 (1906) (an adverse possession situation; dicta says unknown
claim may be barred); Conner v. Goodman, 104 Ill. 365 (1882) (unknown
claim barred in adverse possession situation); Leroy v. City of Springfield, 81 Ill. 114 (1876) (extent of personal injury not discovered after
sidewalk collapsed); Antczak v. Antczak, 61 Ill. App. 2d 404, 209 N.E.2d
838 (1965) (inability to prove cause of action will not toll statute); Nogle
v. Nogle, 53 Ill. App. 457, 202 N.E.2d 683 (1964) (unknown divorce decree claim not set aside); Toft v. Acacia Mausoleum Corp., 322 Ill. App.
514, 54 N.E.2d 616 (1944) (purchaser of note unknown); Proctor v. Wells
Bros., 181 Ill. App. 468 (1914) (new claim not allowed when plaintiff sued
the wrong party); Calumet Elec. St. R.R. v. Mabie, 66 Ill. App. 235 (1896)
(statute runs from infliction of personal injuries and not from time full
extent of the damages has been ascertained); Carr v. Bennett, 21 Ill. App.
137 (1886) (claim barred even though plaintiff did not know his horse
had been taken); Means v. Jenkins, 18 Ill. App. 41 (1885) (money collected by agent); Mattison-Greenlee Serv. Corp. v. Cullhane, 103 F.2d
608 (7th Cir. 1939) (applying Illinois law; time of discovery rule not applicable against unknown embezzler).
Illinois has a few early cases which apparently support the time of
discovery rule. Madison v. Wedron Silica Corp., 352 Ill. 60, 184 N.E. 901
(1933) (cumulative disease); Gunn v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
322 Ill. App. 313, 54 N.E.2d 596 (1944) (cause of action accrued when
policy holder discovered his insurance had lapsed even though the agent
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dent, the World of Fashion court cited numerous cases from other
92
jurisdictions which implemented the time of discovery rule.
In conclusion, the court set out one of the most explicit sentences of any modern Illinois case defining its view of the statute
of limitations. The court said, "The purpose of a statute of limitations is certainly not to shield a wrongdoer; rather it is to discourage the presentation of stale claims and to encourage diligence in the bringing of actions. ' 9 3' This sentence must be compared to that of the same court twenty-one years earlier in Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co. 94 where
the court said, "The basic purpose for such statutes of limitations
is to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to investigate the
circumstances upon which liability against him is predicated
while the facts are accessible."95
In 1954, the basic purpose of the statute was directed toward
protecting the defendant. Current judicial emphasis has moved
away from interpreting the statutes as aids to hapless defendants,
an interpretation which was the foundation of the nineteenth and
twentieth century courts' acceptance of the limitations periods.
Rotating in a great arc, the current courts have shifted back to
the seventeenth and eighteenth century position which considered the arbitrary limitation periods inequitable. In 1770, Lord
Mansfield created "moral consideration" for the promise to pay
a barred debt in order to avoid a statutory limitation which he
felt unfairly discriminated against plaintiffs. In the mid-twentieth century the courts have given wide implementation to a
time of discovery rule in order to avoid similar unfairness.
The Time of Discovery Rule: An Unlimited Application?
Before concluding prematurely, however, that the time of
discovery rule will be greatly expanded in Illinois following
World of Fashion (although this conclusion seems justified on
the face of the decision),96 it should be pointed out that there
are several areas of Illinois law where the time of discovery rule
and insurance company were keeping his premiums); Wanless v. Peabody Coal Co., 294 Ill. App. 401, 13 N.E.2d 996 (1938) (time of discovery
rule used in mining trespass). The Rozny court cited only the Wanless

case as support for the time of discovery rule, and Eichelberger v. Homerding, 317 Ill. App. 125, 45 N.E.2d 493 (1942)

(decision decides when

a statute of limitations runs for encumbrances on land) (semble), as authority for implementing the rule. Eichelberger seems to be questionable support.
92. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 134-35, 334 N.E.2d 160, 163-64 (1975).
93. Id. at 137, 334 N.E.2d at 164.
94. 4 Ill. 2d 273, 122 N.E.2d 540 (1954).
95. Id. at 289-90, 122 N.E.2d at 549.
96. See Scott, For Whom the Time Tolls-Time of Discovery and the
Statute of Limitations, 1976 ILL. B.J. 326, 332. This article suggests that
a broad expansion of the rule will follow World of Fashion.
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traditionally has not been applied. In an ordinary negligence
action, suit must be filed within a period calculated from the
occurrence of the act which caused the injury. A failure to discover the resulting injury does not toll the statute.9 7 When suit
is filed as a result of an injury, the plaintiff's compensation must
be based upon observable and probable consequences arising
from the injury and not upon speculative claims of unknown
damage.98 And a subsequent complication, undiscovered before
the final judgment is rendered, cannot be remedied later.9 9 Related cases in another area of the law indicate that the statute
runs against the plaintiff for adverse possession even though the
plaintiff may be unaware of his claim to the property in question. 100 In Dram Shop Act cases the statute begins to run when
the liquor is served, not when the plaintiff discovers that the
defendant's actions caused an injury or death. 10 1 But, most explicitly-and importantly in light of World of Fashion-the Uniform Commercial Code states that "a cause of action accrues
when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack
of knowledge of the breach.

' 10 2

This statement demonstrates

that the legislature clearly recognized the problem of undiscov97. See 25 I.L. & P. Limitations § 54 (1956).
98. See 15 I.L. & P Damages §§ 14, 32, 34 (1968).
99. See the colorful English case of Fetter v. Beal, 1 Salk. 11, 91 Eng.
Rep. 11 (K.B. 1795) (where the defendant "beateth" the plaintiff's head
upon the ground, and the plaintiff recovered damages for the beating.
Subsequently a piece of plaintiff's skull "was come out" and he was
barred from further recovery by the previous judgment); 15 I.L. & P.
Damages §§ 14, 32, 34 (1968).
100. See generally Annot., 156 A.L.R. 253 (1945) (when statute of limitations commences to run on action for wrongful seizure of property of
third persons under process or court order) for a detailed discussion of
adverse possession and the statute of limitations. See also Waterman
Hall v. Waterman, 220 Ill. 569, 77 N.E. 142 (1906) (true owners did not
realize they had title); Dugan v. Follett, 100 Ill. 581 (1881) (barred claim
even though plaintiff did not know of a title transfer); Isham v. Cudlip,
33 Ill. App. 2d 254, 179 N.E.2d 25 (1962) (house was determined to be
personal property and owners were unaware of their claim). In one
sense the adverse possession cases are quite similar to medical malpractice cases: often neither party knows that there is a cause of action because neither knows that an injury occurred.
101. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1975). Lowery v. Malkowski, 20
Ill. 2d 280, 170 N.E.2d 147, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 879 (1961) (since disabilities are not specifically mentioned in the statute the court will not toll
it for a minor); Myers v. Green, 5 Ill. App. 3d 816, 284 N.E.2d 349 (1972)
(action accrues when person was arrested outside of bar, not when wife
discovered her loss of support due to husband's jailing); Super Valu
Stores, Inc. v. Stompanato, 128 Ill. App. 2d 243, 261 N.E.2d 830 (1970)
(action accrued at time of accident, not when workman's compensation
insurer found out about the dram shop claim); Dabney v. Marvin, 155
Ill. App. 238 (1911) (when the liquor was served, not when the injury
occurred).
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-725 (1975). The code comment to subsection (2) states that the sentence quoted in the text "is in accord with
prior Illinois decisions in other areas of law that ignorance of a cause
of action in no way affects the running of the statute of limitations." ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-725 (Smith-Hurd 1974).
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ered injuries in commercial contexts. The time of discovery rule
was consciously excluded.
The Statute of Limitations and the Qualified Privilege Defense
Crucial to understanding World of Fashion and predicting
its impact is an understanding of why the court analogized the
facts in this case to the facts of cases where the time of discovery
rule had been applied rather than to the facts of cases, particularly commercial cases, where the rule had not been applied. The
interrelationship of certain vague aspects of the statute of limitations for defamation and the recognition by the court of the
quasi-personal injury nature of false credit reports apparently
is the key to the analogy.
Traditionally slander has had one of the shortest limitation
periods of any legal remedy, the limited time presumably necessary to balance the somewhat ephemeral nature of the evidence. 10 3 The period of time ran from the publication of the
slander.10 4 Libel, however, had received separate, and longer,
statutory treatment until the middle of the nineteenth century.
This separation, apparently based on the greater damages caused
by libel and the greater ease of preserving evidence of libel gave
that tort a much longer statute of limitation. 10 5 Slander originally was two years; libel, six years.
In 1861 the Illinois legislature eliminated the separation and
gave both torts a one-year period of limitations. Ten years later
the legislature dropped from the statute three words-"and not
after"-traditionally used by legislative bodies to limit absolutely
the judicial ability to interpret or extend the statutes. Consequently, the deletion of these words from the defamation statute

103. See E. SEELMAN,

THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL OF NEW YORK

(1933).

4

But see H. FOLKARD
which indicates that a plain-

104. Colby v. McGee, 48 Ill. App. 294 (1897).

STARKIE ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 521 (1877),

tiff may plead that the action did not accrue until the special damage
occurred, even though publication had been earlier. Additional cases
from other jurisdictions support the text's statement. Prather v. Neva
Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971) (blameless ignorance doctrine not applied in copyright action and statute determined to run from
publication regardless of fact that plaintiff was unaware of publication);
Grist v. Upjohn, 1 Mich. App. 72, 134 N.W.2d 358 (1965) (time runs from
speaking, not discovery); Brown v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 212 F. Supp.

832 (D.C. Mo. 1963) (from date letter stamped "received", not when

plaintiff had knowledge of receipt); Barnard and Wife v. Boulware, 5
Mo. 454 (1838) (the court suggested that the reason for the running of

the statute from time of publication and not from time of discovery is
that the plaintiff has an obligation to find out if he has been libeled);
Gordon v. Fredle, 206 N.C. 734, 175 S.E. 126 (1934) (semble) (time not
tolled when plaintiff had defamatory letter but had not discovered who
had written it).
105. See generally E. SEELMAN, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL OF
NEW YORK ch. 1 (1933).
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soon after the shortening of the time period should not be viewed
as inadvertent. 10 6 The words are retained in certain sections of
10
the modern Illinois limitations statute. '
A second reason advanced for the shorter time limitation applicable to defamation actions is the assumption that a person
could not be injured too seriously if that person did not choose
to bring suit within a short period of time. The assumption that
defamation often causes dramatic but short-lived injury, also accounts for the traditional distinction between libel and slander
per se and slander per quod. Libel and slander per se were presumed to cause serious damages. But even the presumed damages of libel evaporated after a short period of time and certainly
were lost when the plaintiff did not even know of the defama106. A brief historical analysis of the defamation limitations in Illinois
is helpful for understanding the subtle shifts in legislative intent. Based
on the English model, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, § 3, the earliest legislative
position (Laws of the Northwest Territory, 1788-1800, ch. 10, at 25), sets
out Illinois' original, limitation period for defamation. An "action on the
case for slander, [must be brought] within two years next after the
cause of action." Libel had a six year statute.
The legislature, in 1827, changed the law slightly reducing the length
of time for slander to one year and libel to five years. 1827 Ill. Laws § 3
at 285. No changes were made in the statute in 1833 or 1845. See Hazell
v. Shelly, 11 Ill. 9 (1849) ("words spoken" statute does not include libel
which had a longer time allowance).
But, in 1861, a distinct change, combining slander and libel, was
made. "Every action on the case, for slander and libel, shall be commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued, and not
after." 1861 Ill. Laws § 2 at 142. And, in 1972, another significant
change took place when the legislature dropped the words of absolute
limitation, "and not after." 1872 Ill. Laws § 12-13 at 559. See Benyon
v. Evelyn, 124 Eng. Rep. 614, 636 (C.P. 1664): "But it rests not there,
but adds 'and not after', which negative words are the strongest words
that can be in law."
107. The words "and not after" are retained in the following sections
of the limitations statutes: actions by railroads to recover costs of services, ILL. Rgv. STAT. ch. 83, § 24c (1975); actions based on the extended
time period allowed following the discovery of a fraudulently concealed
claim ("within five years after the person entitled to bring the same
[action] discovers that he has such a cause of action, and not afterwards."), ILL. REzv. STAT. ch. 83, § 23 (1975). The words were dropped
from the refiling statute ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 24a (1975), in the 1967
amendments. 1967 Ill. Laws § 1 at 615.
In 1959 the legislature added a privacy clause to the defamation statute "or for publication of matter violating the right to privacy." 1959 Ill.
Laws § 1 at 1770. This addition poses another question. Since the statute explicitly says "publication of matter" it appears to set a limit only
on three of the four traditional areas of right of privacy: appropriation,
public disclosure of private facts, and placing the plaintiff in a false light
in the public eye. See PRossER, ToRTs 802 (4th ed. 1971). "Intrusion"
apparently is not covered by the statute. It would seem from this that
a plaintiff could be barred from an action against a peeping Tom who
published a surreptitiously obtained photograph a year after the taking,
but could maintain the right to sue for the taking of the picture for a
period longer than a year. Thus, the far more serious tort seems to have
a shorter limitation period. One explanation is that the legislature may
not have considered the problem of an unknown publication or defamation; without a publication, the injured party needed longer to discover
the occurrence of the tort.
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tion." 8s The reasonableness of this interpretation in the older
cases is unquestioned. However, the modern implementation of
such old rules must be viewed in light of the tremendous changes
which have occurred since those decisions were made.
The modern commercial world is far more complex than it
was years ago. Modern businesses are forced into many unavoidable relationships simply because of the complexity of the commercial world. One such relationship, unavoidable today, involves credit reporting agencies. The plaintiff in World of Fashion did not choose to have the defendant disseminate a credit
report about it. The complexities of modern business, however,
dictated such a procedure. As has been demonstrated earlier,
the presence of these unavoidable relationships aided the Supreme Court of Illinois in determining that a cause of action for
personal injury in products liability accrued when the plaintiff
was injured and not when the product was purchased. In the
products cases, the court reasoned that a purchaser could not
be expected to know that a hidden defect would eventually cause
a personal injury. In World of Fashion, the court apparently
reasoned along similar lines regarding injuries caused by credit
reporting agencies. The court recognized the "manifest injustice
of permitting persons investigated to be silently wronged
through inaccurate reporting."'10 9
By analyzing the products liability cases in relation to the
World of Fashion facts, a vague inference can be gathered that
the Illinois Supreme Court is fashioning a new exception to the
running of the statute of limitations to correspond with the recognized exceptions of relationships of expertise or confidence and
cumulative injuries. 10 This new exception, justified by the
changes brought about in the modern commercial world, seemingly tolls the statute of limitation where the plaintiff has an
"unavoidable relationship" with the defendant, a relationship essential to functioning in the modern business world. An unavoidable relationship apparently involves the necessary conjunction of a consumer with products or services necessary to
a modern and efficient existence.
After resolving the statute of limitations problem, the Illinois
Supreme Court dealt with the qualified privilege defense given
108. In Barnard and Wife v. Boulware, 5 Mo. 454, 456 (1838), the court
states:
It is an abuse of language to pretend that the cause of action did
not accrue until the plaintiffs were informed that words had been
spoken ....
[I]t does not seem probable that the law making
power should intend to strain language so far as to intend that the
time when the right of action accrued was the time when the plaintiff might come to knowledge of the speaking of slanderous words.
109. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164.
110. Id. at 129, 137, 334 N.E.2d at 164.

392 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10:359
to credit reporting agencies."1
Because the qualified privilege
was not actually at issue in the case at this point (the libel counts
having been dismissed below because of the statute of limitations) the court's statements about the qualified privilege defense
are dicta. But the dicta implies that the court will rule against
the qualified privilege defense for credit reporting agencies if
that issue subsequently comes before it. The court cited as its
principal influence the 1973 fifth circuit decision, Hood v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc.,1 2 a long and carefully reasoned defense of
Georgia's minority position denying the qualified privilege defense to credit reporting agencies. The World of Fashion court
said, "In recent years there has been an increasing awareness
of the importance and sensitivity of credit reporting from the
standpoint of the persons investigated. There has been an increased recognition of the manifest injustice of permitting persons investigated to be silently wronged through inaccurate reporting." 1 3
After setting forth its position," 4 the Illinois court quickly
distinguished two federal court cases which had held that the
time of discovery rule could not be applied in credit reporting
agency actions. 115 The World of Fashion court reasoned that
111. One of the most complete modern discussions of the entire credit
reporting area of law, with special emphasis on the credit reporting agencies' qualified privilege defense, is Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit
Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035 (1970).
112. 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973). For a detailed analysis of Hood and
the qualified privilege defense in Texas, see Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (court agreed with Hood
reasoning but felt bound by Texas law).
113. 61 Ill.
2d 129, 137, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1975).
114. Id. In addition to Hood, the World of Fashion court cited another
federal case as support for the time of discovery rule, Parrent v. Midwest
Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972). In Parrent the statute of
limitations did not run because the cause of action had been fraudulently
concealed from the plaintiff. Fraudulent concealment is one of the traditional legislative exceptions to the statute of limitations. Two other federal cases, uncited in World of Fashion, refused to implement the time
of discovery rule in commercial transactions. Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d
993 (7th Cir. 1974) (unawareness of stock transfer did not toll the statute); Saunders v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 348 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(court would not apply time of discovery rule in an action charging a
Clayton Act violation).
115. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 137-38, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164-65. The cases cited in
this footnote appear directly to contradict the holding in World of Fashion: Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 438 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1971) was said
by the World of Fashion court to be "simply" based upon an old Mississippi decision. It is salutary to compare the old Mississippi decision cited
in Wilson, McCarlie v. Atkinson, 77 Miss. 594, 27 So. 641 (1900) (statute
of limitation starts when letter was opened and read by third party, not
when plaintiff discovered the libel) with a slightly older Illinois decision,
Colby v. McGee, 48 Ill. App. 294 (semble) (1894) (action accrues when
words spoken, not when discovered). The old Illinois case seems to
agree with the Mississippi decision that the cause of action accrues when
the defamation is published, not when the plaintiff discovers the defamation. One possibly significant fact, however, should not be overlooked.
The Mississippi statute, Miss. CODE ANN., § 732 (1942), referred to in
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"each [case] involves a simply mechanical application by a Federal court of an earlier holding by a State court." 116 It is significant to note that this sentence strangely echoes an earlier statement in the World of Fashion opinion which justified using the
time of discovery rule and established the court's unwillingness
"to follow an abstract and mechanical reasoning in deciding when
1 7
the cause of action accrued. "
The Illinois Supreme Court buttressed its case favoring recovery against the credit reporting agency with a reference to
the Fair Credit Reporting Act."" The FCRA provides significant
defense for consumers against errors of credit agencies and implicitly refutes Professor Smith's 1914 article which had argued
that the credit reporting agencies really did not do enough damage to warrant stripping them of the qualified privilege defense.
The Illinois court's reference to the FCRA as "legislation . ..
enacted to protect individuals from abuses in this type of reporting" is weakened somewhat, however, by the fact that the FCRA
consciously and explicitly excluded from its provisions the type
of commercial credit report at issue in World of Fashion."9
McCarlie contains the words of absolute limitation, "and not after."

In
1894, when Colby was decided, Illinois had already dropped the words.
Atwell v. Retail Credit Co., 431 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1970), was said
by the World of Fashion court to be mechanically following a state court
holding under Maryland law. This Maryland federal case refused to apply the time of discovery rule in a defamation action even though Maryland has allowed limited "discovery" exceptions as far back as 1914.
Maryland now has a statute or, the discovery rule, MD. ANN. CODE art.
57, § 1 (1957), which is quite similar to the Illinois statute.
Not cited in World of Fashion but also denying recovery against
credit agencies, based on time of discovery rule: Peacock v. Retail Credit
Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969), affirmed in a short, but very complimentary decision, 419 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1970).
A Texas decision, also directly on point, Bratcher v. Pecos Motors,
Inc., 408 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1966), states that the action accrued when the
report went to the subscribers and not when the plaintiff discovered the
defamation. The significance of this decision to the World of Fashion
case should not be underestimated. At about the same time Texas was
denying the plaintiff's right to use the time of discovery rule in a credit
reporting agency situation, the Texas courts shifted position on the application of the rule in malpractice cases. Carroll v. Denton, 138 Tex. 145,
157 S.W.2d 878 (1942) (an earlier Texas case refusing the time of discovery rule's application in malpractice which was overruled just after the
Texas court decided Bratcher). The state now accepts the discovery rule
in malpractice actions. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967). See
also Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 807 (1972) (what constitutes "publication" of
libel in order to start the running of the period of limitation).
A distinct problem arises at this point in the World of Fashion opinion. It is impossible to tell from the decision which aspect of the federal
cases-Wilson and Atwell--the Illinois court disapproved. Both federal
cases refused to apply the time of discovery rule and both cases gave
the credit reporting agencies a qualified privilege defense.
116. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 138, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1975).
117. Id. at 137, 334 N.E.2d at 164.
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-681 (1970). See Comment, Libel Suits Against
Credit Reporting Agencies, 2 U.S.F.V.L. RFv. 179 (1973). 61 Ill. 2d at
137, 334 N.E.2d at 164.
119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-681 (1970) applies only to consumer credit reports. The courta have clearly indicated that no application is appropri-

394 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10: 359
The cursory method with which the court dismissed cases
from other jurisdictions indicates that it is prepared to make new
law in this area. Surprisingly, for such a large commercial state,
Illinois has no direct authority on the qualified privilege defense
for credit reporting agencies. Only two Illinois cases briefly
touch upon the qualified privilege and credit reports. Zeinfield
v. Hayes Freight Lines,120 a supreme court case, involved a letter
of reference sent by the plaintiff's former employer to a building
corporation. The letter contained some credit information. The
defendant employer (not a credit reporting agency) was allowed
to plead the traditional qualified privilege defense based on the
12 1
fact that he had a legitimate interest of his own to protect.
Bloomfield v. Retail Credit Co.,' 22 a 1973 appellate decision,
simply assumes that the defendant credit reporting agency had
the qualified privilege defense. The plaintiff apparently stipulated the defense. In Bloomfield, the case was remanded to the
lower court for a determination of whether there was actual malice involved in the publication which would destroy the qualified
23
privilege.
ate in commercial settings. Wrigley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 969 (N.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, no opinion, 500 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.
1974); Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Co., 360 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Beresch v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 260 (C.D. Calif. 1973); Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1972); Note, The
Fair Credit Reporting Act: Credit Reports Regulated?, 71 DUKE L.J. 1229
(1971).
120. 41 Ill. 2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217 (1969).
121. Id. Zeinfield has been cited in relation to credit reporting agencies only once. Counsel for plaintiff in Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1972), however, missed the distinction in
Zeinfield and stipulated, based on Zeinfield, that Dun & Bradstreet had a
qualified privilege in Illinois.
122. 14 Ill. App. 3d 158, 302 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
123. The Bloomfield decision appears to be a shift back to the reasoning of the older cases. The modern trend in the decisions eases somewhat, the proof of malice and ill will generally necessary to break the
qualified privilege defense. Many courts are moving to the acceptance
of "implied malice" or even mere negligence to revoke the privilege. See
generally Note, The Mercantile Agency and the Qualified Privilege in
Defamation, 11 S.C.L.Q. 256 (1959); Note, Torts, Massachusetts Finds
Abuse of Qualified Privilege Without Proof of Malice in Slander Case,
10 DE PAUL L. REV. 222 (1960); Note, Libel, Qualified Privilege: Does
a Mercantile Agency Enjoy a Qualified Privilege?, 36 N.D.L. REV. 201
(1960).
Illinois, however, has a case which seems to go against this trend.
In Bloomfield v. Retail Credit Co., 14 Ill. App. 3d 158, 302 N.E.2d 88
(1973), the existence of the qualified privilege defense was not in issue
because the plaintiff stipulated to the defense. The appellate court remanded to determine the existence of malice. See Comment, The Consumer v. The Credit Bureau: Whom Does the Law Protect?, 7 CAL. W.L.
REV. 216 (1970). Contra, Comment, Libel and The Corporate Plaintiff,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 1496 (1969) (favoring the requirement of actual malice
for all corporate statement libel actions).
If credit reporting agencies are given the qualified privilege defense
in Illinois it will be very difficult to recover from them. John v. Tribune
Co., 28 Ill. App. 2d 300, 316, 171 N.E.2d 432, 441 (1961) sets out Illinois'
abuse of the qualified privilege: "a positive desire and intention to an-
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The World of Fashion court cited neither of the Illinois cases.
It did, however, quote with approval from the Hood v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. federal decision suggesting " 'that in recent years
there has been an apparent shift in emphasis from the protection
of the credit reporting agency to the protection of the individual or business being investigated.' "124 This "shift in emphasis,"
from protection of the defendant to protection for the plaintiff,
is, of course, exactly the same realignment that is taking place
in the time of discovery rule cases. The courts are now seeniingly deciding that fairness and equity for plaintiffs outweigh
certainty and finality for defendants.
The Transferringof Costs and the Return of Equity
If the Illinois Supreme Court ultimately follows its World
of Fashion dicta and places the cost of a credit reporting agency's
mistake on the responsible party it will have attempted to shift
the cost of an injury to the defendant in much the same way
it is shifting the cost in time of discovery rule cases. However,
a crucial element in this transferring of costs is rarely discussed.
As defendants' potential liabilities increase so will their purchases of insurance to cover the cost of these liabilities. 1 25 But
the cost of this increased insurance protection is not borne by
the defendants alone. It, in turn, is transferred to the purchaser
of the defendants' services in the form of higher prices. Thus,
although the courts state that they are shifting the cost of the
injury from the plaintiff to the defendant, in reality they are
shifting the cost of the injury from the plaintiff to the defendants'
customers. The costs are not so much shifted as dissipated. The
astronomical size of modern malpractice damage awards seems
to be a reflection of the courts' implicit recognition of this dissipation of costs.
noy or injure another person ...
" See also H.E. Crawford Co. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1957) (actual malice needed);
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Miller, 398 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1968) (report
not sufficiently libelous).

But, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Nicklaus, 340

F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1965) (privilege destroyed), no actual malice was required.
124. 61 111. 2d 129, 137, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (quoting Hood v. Dun &
-Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 32).

125. See James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of
Torts, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 431 (1950); Comment, The Last Vestige
of the Citadel, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 721 (1974) (discussing the interplay
of insurance and products liability). The most extensive discussion of
this problem is found in G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIc ANALYSIS (1970). Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508
F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975) directly tied the cost of injuries to insurance
when the court said, "Certainly the risk that any item will fail after the
expiration of contract warranties but before anticipated useful life has

ended is foreseeable; that risk may be covered by insurance or by a specific contractual provision." Id. at 613.
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With the increased implementation of the time of discovery
rule following World of Fashion, if that decision can be read to
broaden the rule, the courts will be faced with the return of equi126
table vagueness such as the balancing test suggested in Rozny.
This test determines the outcome of the litigation by weighing
the difficulty the defendant is faced with in obtaining proof to
establish his defense against the hardship caused a plaintiff who
did not know of his injury. 1 27 The balancing test substitutes the
court's idea of fairness for the legislative body's idea of certainty.
A concomitant development of the move toward equity will be
the increasing dissipation of the value of earlier cases as precedent in this area of the law; the balancing test suggests that a
case by case analysis should replace strict statutory construction
in statute of limitations controversies.
But the balancing test is not the only area of vagueness
opened up by the return of equity to the statute of limitations.
Other equitable problems have already begun to reappear in law
actions concerning limitations periods.
In Hayes v. Weyrens,128 a nurse was denied recovery despite
the application of the time of discovery rule because the court
reasoned that she should have realized sooner that she had been
injured. It is difficult to determine whether the case turns on
126. The Rozny court sets the balancing test:
The basic problem is one of balancing the increase in difficulty of
proof which accompanies the passage of time against the hardship
to the plaintiff who neither knows nor should have known of the
existence of his right to sue. There are some actions in which the
passage of time, from the instance when the facts giving rise to liability occurred, so greatly increases the problems of proof that it has
been deemed necessary to bar plaintiffs who had not become aware
of their rights of action within the statutory period as measured from
the time such facts occurred....
But where the passage of time
does little to increase the problems of proof, the ends of justice are
served by permitting plaintiff to sue within the statutory period
computed from the time at which he knew or should have known
of the existence of the right to sue.
43 Ill. 2d 54, 70, 250 N.E.2d 656, 664-65.
In Rozny, the court places great emphasis on the potential problems
of widespread application of the rule. Quoting Cardozo's well-known
opinion, Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441
(1931) the court warns about "potential 'liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.'" Id. at
63, 250 N.E.2d at 661.
127. The difficulty of proof for the defendant seems extraordinary in
two particular cases regarding issues not involving personal injury.
Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968)
where a city bought parking meters in 1942, installed one in 1950 which
broke in 1964 causing property damage. The city collected damages in
a suit filed 22 years after the product was sold. See also Quimby v.
Blackey, 63 N.H. 77 (1884) where plaintiff lost his wallet in 1871, discovered that the defendant had the wallet in 1883, sued, and won. The use
of the time of discovery rule in these cases seems unsupportable.
128. 15 Ill. App. 3d 365, 304 N.E.2d 502 (1973). See generally 2 J.
PomEsoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 169 (5th ed 1941) for a discussion of
laches and the statutes of limitation. Generally, laches will not bar a
suit filed within the statutory period, with a few exceptions.
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the question of knowledge or laches. In Quirino v. Chicago Tribbune-New York News Syndicate1 29 the plaintiff was not allowed
to refile his libel action after his first attempted suit had been
dismissed for want of prosecution. Despite the fact that the
plaintiff was within the one year statutory period allowed for
refiling following this kind of dismissal the appellate court dismissed the new action on the grounds of laches. Furthermore,
the point in the balancing test at which an action will not be
allowed because of the loss of evidence seems evanescent at most.
No case has been found which implements the time of discovery
rule's balancing test to deny the plaintiff recovery. 130
The lack of authority implementing the negative side of the
balancing test is readily understandable however. Prior to the
holding in World of Fashion, and to a certain extent in Rozny,
the time of discovery rule had only been used in situations where
the defendant's liability was clear but for the statute of limitations defense. There seldom are evidentiary problems in time
of discovery rule cases.' 31 In fact, Rozny and World of Fashion
are quite unique in American law in that there are issues in the
cases other than the time of discovery rule. Although the holdings in the Illinois cases certainly are not dicta, their impact is
diluted somewhat by the interconnection between the statute of
limitations aspects and the other important issues of law involved.
CONCLUSION

The decision in World of Fashion apparently has pointed the
Illinois Supreme Court in either of two directions. If the court
ultimately follows its World of Fashion dicta and denies the defendant credit reporting agency the qualified privilege defense,
thereby adopting the minority position, the court's use of what
appears to be a vague new statute of limitations exception, an
129.

10 Ill. App. 3d 148, 294 N.E.2d 29 (1973).

See

also Aranda v. Ho-

bart Mfg. Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 902, 342 N.E.2d 830 (1976).
130. 61 Ill. 2d 129, 133, 334 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1975). The Rozny court
said that occasionally a plaintiff may not be allowed recovery because

of evidentiary inadequacies. The court cites Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.
2d 455, 458, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1967) and New Market Poultry Farms,
Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1967). The only reference in
Skinner to the time of discovery rule is to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-

725 (1975) which refers to the discovery rule in commercial contexts and
refuses to apply the rule. Ironically, Skinner held that a statute extending the liability period against architects and contractors was unconstitutional. New Market applies the discovery rule against a surveyor 11

years after the survey was completed.
131. In Henahan, Malpractice, 237 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 12 (1976), an
incident was reported where a surgical towel was discovered in a soldier
several months after his discharge. The Army surgeons denied all liability until plaintiff's attorney pointed out that the towel was plainly
marked "U.S. Army."
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exception based on the presence of an unavoidable relationship,
will not be considered unusual. The precedent value of the instant decision could then easily be confined to its facts; the true
emphasis of the case will be seen to revolve around the privilege
defense. However, if the court rejects its World of Fashion dicta
and eventually decides that credit reporting agencies should be
allowed to plead the qualified privilege defense, the statute of
limitations exception set forth in World of Fashion must be read
as a significant expansion of the time of discovery rule.
While considering the qualified privilege defense, the Illinois
court apparently recognized the contradictory positions being
taken by many American courts which rule for the defendant
in credit reporting agency situations and for the plaintiff in time
of discovery rule situations. The courts, in statute of limitations
cases, are shifting the cost of a plaintiff's injury from the plaintiff
to the defendant (and thus to society). This is the "fairness"
approach to justice. But these same courts, at the same time,
are insisting in the credit reporting situations that the plaintiff
must bear the cost of the defendant's tort for the good of society,
that is, the plaintiff may not recover even though the defendant
is clearly at fault. And this is a variation of the "certainty" approach to justice, "certainty" realistically seen as a euphemism
for protecting defendants. The World of Fashion court's implied
rejection of the qualified privilege defense suggests that the Illi18 2
nois court may be moving to a consistent "fairness" approach.
However, any expansion in the fairness approach will be limited somewhat by the supreme court's realistic expectation of a
negative legislative reaction if the court moves too far too fast.
The Illinois Supreme Court certainly must realize, in light of the
1975 malpractice legislation limiting the court's time of discovery
rule freedom, that the legislature has a different idea about justice. The legislature, always more susceptible than the courts
to pressure from defendants and the institutional forces of society
favoring certainty and finality, could easily restrict the equitable
inclinations of the judges. The legislature appears to favor certainty, thus, defendant's rights; the courts favor fairness, thus
plaintiff's rights.
There is no legislative limitation on the courts' regarding the
qualified privilege defense for credit agencies. Here judicial inclination matches legislative intention. The current trend in leg132. Both Georgia and Idaho have already achieved the consistency
suggested by accepting the time of discovery rule and denying the qualified privilege defense to credit reporting agencies. In Parker v. Vaughn,
124 Ga. App. 300, 183 S.E.2d 605 (1971), Georgia overruled a strong line
of precedent and accepted the time of discovery rule in medical malpractice. Idaho accepted the time of discovery rule in 1972. Johnson v. Gorton, 94 Idaho 595, 495 P.2d 1 (1972).
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islation is clearly toward controlling credit reporting agencies.
The unique position of the Illinois Supreme Court, never having
ruled on the issue of credit reporting agencies' qualified privilege
defense, presents the court with a dramatic opportunity to influence American law if the privilege defense is rejected. Although
authority from other jurisdictions clearly favors the privilege,
the World of Fashion dicta implies disagreement.
In two ways, therefore, the decision in World of Fashion reflects a judicial trend toward shifting the cost of an injury from
the innocent plaintiff to the party responsible for the injury and
thus ultimately dissipating that cost throughout society. The judicial exceptions to the statute of limitations allowing a time of
discovery rule and the implied rejection of a credit reporting
agency's qualified privilege defense in defamation express the
court's inclination to view justice as "fairness." Those who view
justice as "certainty" apparently will not find much support in
the Illinois Supreme Court.
Paul Wangerin

